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“Historically, privacy was almost implicit, because it was hard to find 
and gather information. But in the digital world, whether it’s digital 
cameras or satellites or just what you click on, we need to have more 
explicit rules - not just for governments but for private companies.” 1  
 
                                                          
 J.D. 2018, magna cum laude, Michigan State University College of Law; B.S.B.A. 2015, 
Western New England University. The author is a licensed attorney in Massachusetts and 
hopes to obtain work in the data privacy or business law fields. 
 
 1 Steven Levy, Bill Gates and President Bill Clinton on the NSA, Safe Sex, and 
American Exceptionalism, WIRED (Nov. 12, 2013, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2013/11/bill-gates-bill-clinton-wired/ (quoting Bill Gate’s response 
to the discovery of widespread data collection by the NSA and how surveillance and 
security must strike a balance). 
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The evolution of information technology catalyzes economic globalization as 
larger quantities of data are easily stored, processed, and circulated across the 
globe in a matter of seconds.2 Online shopping, also known as e-commerce, has 
contributed significantly to the issue of data privacy because records are 
instantly updated with a large breadth of customer information.3 While the 
simple disclosure of a name, address, phone number, and credit card number 
may not seem like much information, this basic data enables algorithms to 
compile more complete personal data profiles.4 For example, a website with 
registered accounts is able to track consumer search and purchase histories.5 
Predictive algorithms process information to predict buyer behavior, such as 
what products a consumer is likely to purchase as well as the most effective type, 
and placement, of advertisements.6 These activities have become the norm, as 
consumers are either numb or oblivious to the information they consent to 
disclosing to companies.7 After all, the only way a consumer can utilize online 
                                                          
 2 Gao Shangquan, Economic Globalization: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention, U.N. 
Doc. ST/ESA/2000/CDP/1, at 1 (2000), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp2000_1.pdf 
(discussing the rapid growth of technology and its ability to cut costs and expedite 
communications as well as providing statistics to show how even sixteen years ago, 
technology was beginning to shape the global economic landscape); 
see also Nicolas Pologeorgis, How Globalization Affects Developed Countries, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:59 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/globalization-developed-countries.asp 
(explaining how globalization has continued to increase as newer, more efficient 
technologies promote international trade). 
 3 The Importance of Gathering and Using Demographic Data for Fulfillment, FLOSHIP, 
http://www.floship.com/importance-gathering-using-demographic-data-fulfillment (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2018) (detailing how online shopping and the growth of e-commerce has 
rapidly expanded the amount and types of data companies can instantaneously collect and 
analyze to predict consumer spending, to target advertising, and to improve customer 
relations, among other many benefits) [hereinafter Demographic Data]; see also Adam C. 
Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing With It), BUS. 
NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-
businesses-collecting-data.html (discussing means of data collection and potential business 
uses for consumer data). 
 4 Demographic Data, supra note 3 (stating that simple purchase data is the surface 
level of information that companies can collect as technology and analytics continue to 
improve). 
 5 See Nicole Fallon, Boosting Customer Loyalty with Big Data, FOX BUS. (Apr. 28, 
2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2014/04/28/boosting-customer-loyalty-with-
big-data.html (reporting the benefits of customer loyalty programs, the emphasis of 
companies on targeting repeat buyers, and the ability to track and predict purchase 
tendencies). 
 6 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secret, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_r=0. 
 7 Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-
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services is to agree to a company’s privacy policies, accept the internet cookies, 
and to supply their personal information.8 However, until a data breach occurs, 
consumers continue to carelessly accept these agreements to information 
privacy.9 
Companies store large quantities of personal data that can easily be traced 
back to individuals.10 Corporate data mining and collecting is a global practice, 
so governments must ensure the protection of consumer data beyond industry 
and individual company levels.11 With the continual growth of e-commerce, the 
spread of consumer information transcends national borders.12 After all, 
consumer data concerns citizens from around the world, so each government 
must do its part in ensuring its protection.13 
In 2000, the European Union and the United States, as two of the largest 
economic markets in the world, entered into the U.S.–E.U. Safe Harbor 
Agreement.14 Under this Agreement, the European Union and the United States 
reconciled existing gaps between the European Union’s data protection 
                                                          
and-trust (discussing how companies use general consumer consent to gather as much 
consumer data as possible, even if not useful at the present time, and how customers do not 
know standard data collection practices or the breadth of the data they are giving up). 
 8 Id. 
 9 New FireEye Research Reveals the Impact of High-Profile Security Breaches on U.S. 
Consumers’ Trust of Brands, FIREEYE (May 12, 2016), 
http://investors.fireeye.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=970718 (releasing studies on 
consumer reactions and attitudes toward large data breaches); see also Zach Walker, The 
Impact of Data Breaches and Customer Loyalty, RIPPLESHOT BLOG (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://info.rippleshot.com/blog/data-breaches-and-customer-loyalty (discussing prevalence 
and dangers of data breaches). 
 10 Morey et al., supra note 7. 
 11 Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 355, 356 (2015) (introducing the concept of data protection and the ways in 
which consumers value its collection, use, and protection against companies across the 
world; companies that have evolved in storing, processing, and selling data to third-parties, 
or giving it to the government for security purposes); Courtney M. Bowman, A Primer on 
the GDPR: What You Need to Know, PROSKAUER (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/12/articles/european-union/a-primer-on-the-gdpr-
what-you-need-to-know/ (explaining how the E.U.’s GDPR increases protections for its 
citizens). 
 12 John C. Eustice, Flying into the cloud without falling: understanding the intersection 
between data privacy laws and cloud computing solutions, THOMSON REUTERS, 
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/understanding-data-privacy-and-cloud-
computing (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
 13 Brookman, supra note 11, at 357 (describing the responses of nations around the 
world to personal data as it becomes easier to access); Bowman, supra note 11. 
 14 Commission Staff Working Document on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by 
the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related FAQs Issued by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 8 [hereinafter Safe 
Harbor]. 
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requirements15 and the United States’ privacy laws to allow for the legal transfer 
of personal information collected in Europe of European citizens.16 On October 
6, 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Safe 
Harbor Agreement in the landmark case of Maximillian Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner.17 The Court of Justice emphasized in its holding the 
significant data privacy and data protection policy gaps, and the differences that 
exist between the European Union and the United States.18 In the European 
Union, citizens possess fundamental rights to both privacy19 and the protection 
of personal data.20 The E.U. has embraced this concept through its adoption and 
continual evolution of legislation that guarantees individual’s privacy and data 
protection from misuse by the government and companies alike.21 In contrast, 
there is no explicit individual right to consumer data privacy in the United States 
nor an overarching regulatory scheme.22 
In 2014, under the Safe Harbor Agreement, the European Union and the 
United States participated in transatlantic trade valued over $1.09 trillion and 
approximately $4 trillion in parallel trade of stocks and investments.23 The 
investment of United States based companies into the European economy, and 
                                                          
 15 Id. at 10. 
 16 Id. at 7; MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44257, 
U.S.-EU PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 1 (2016) (giving an overview of 
U.S. and European data privacy laws and a history of their interaction). 
 17 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R., https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362&from=EN 
(invalidating the Safe Harbor Agreement between the European Union and the United States 
in a case arising out of an Irish Facebook user’s suit claiming an unlawful transfer of his 
personal information to Facebook servers located in the United States due to inadequate data 
protection against the United States’ National Security Agency’s surveillance practices). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J.  
(C 326) 393, 397. 
 20 Id. at art. 8. 
 21 Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1973 (2013) (discussing how the European Union’s 
proactive approach to privacy and its continual efforts for improvement has caused countries 
outside the E.U. to develop similar stringent approaches to privacy protection). 
 22 Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet 
Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 661, 668 (1999) (“Individual privacy in the United States is protected 
through a combination of constitutional guarantees, federal and state statutes, regulations, 
and voluntary industry codes of conduct that apply to the public and private sectors in 
different ways.”). 
 23 Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows: 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the Subcomm. on 
Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 21 (2015) 
(statement of Dr. Joshua P. Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development 
program at the Brookings Institute). 
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vice versa, drove this economic boom where “[s]ixty-one percent of U.S. 
imports from the EU and 33 percent of EU imports from the U.S. consist of intra 
firm trade.”24 Roughly 4,500 U.S. companies operated under the Safe Harbor 
Agreement to allow for the transatlantic data transfers.25 Due to such heavy 
reliance on the Safe Harbor, its invalidation has put the international economy 
in jeopardy and companies are left wondering whether they are adequately 
protected from liability in conducting transatlantic data transfers.26 Without the 
Safe Harbor Agreement’s protections, United States based companies must 
consider alternative mechanisms to ensure compliance with the European 
Union’s stringent standards or otherwise face harsh liability.27 
The European Union and the United States recently entered into the E.U.–
U.S. Privacy Shield to restore privacy protection in transatlantic data flows.28 
While quickly enacted with stronger data protections, stark contrasts remain 
between data protection regulations in the European Union and the United 
States.29 The European Union is the global standard for international privacy 
law, and is continuously developing, while the United States continues to 
                                                          
 24 Id. at 23 (stating these statistics dwarf those of other United States trade partners 
where “intra firm trade as a share of U.S. imports from the Pacific Rim (37.2 percent), and 
South/Central America (37 percent)” account for a much smaller percentage of international 
trade). 
 25 Weiss & Archick, supra note 16. 
 26 European Court of Justice Invalidates U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement, BARNES & 
THORNBURG LLP (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.btlaw.com/data-security-and-privacy-and-
ediscovery-data—document-management-law-alert—-european-court-of-justice-invalidates-
us-eu-safe-harbor-agreement-10-09-2015. 
 27 Brian McCormac, Invalidation of Safe Harbor, EU to US Data Security Measures 
Tested, Failed, BROWN WINICK (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.brownwinick.com/news-
blogs/legal-news/invalidation-of-safe-harbor-eu-to-us-data-security-measures-tested-
failed.aspx (recommending companies take proactive steps to protect their liability while 
continuing to conduct transatlantic data transfers following the Safe Harbor Agreement’s 
invalidation. Steps include: reviewing data transfer processes using strict privacy principles, 
implementing the E.U. Model Contract Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) as 
alternative adequacy measures, and ensuring that company privacy policies are accurate and 
complied with); see also European Court of Justice, supra note 26 (providing 
recommendations on how companies can protect themselves from liability in the aftermath 
of the Safe Harbor Agreement’s invalidation); Francoise Gilbert, EU General Data 
Protection Regulation: What Impact For Business Established Outside the European Union, 
19 NO. 11 J. INTERNET J. 3, 3-6 (2016) (“Today, less than 100 companies have sought and 
obtained approval of their BCRs, even though using BCRs as a method to legalize cross-
border transfers has been available for approximately 10 years”). 
 28 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/216, EU Commission and United 
States agree on new framework for transatlantic data flows: EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2, 
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm. 
 29 See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 
GEO. L.J. 117, 120 (2017) (outlining policy differences between U.S. and E.U. despite the 
effort behind the implementation of the Privacy Shield). 
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embrace an antiquated, ineffective approach.30 Additionally, with the United 
States’ view towards international cooperation shifting, negotiations will likely 
become more tense and result in significant delays.31 For companies, this means 
that international data transfers and trade will continue to take place without the 
security of agreements that bridge the gap between internal data privacy laws.32 
Congress must acknowledge that it is unsustainable to continue to simply 
contract around higher global standards through trade agreements destined for 
failure.33 Congress should ease the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) burden 
to promulgate rules within the data privacy context.34 However, even if Congress 
does not ease the burden, the FTC must promulgate a rule that establishes a 
standard for general data protection and requires industry agencies to monitor 
data protection compliance throughout the States.35 
                                                          
 30 See generally Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy 
Law—Its Theoretical Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, 50 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 53 (2014) (discussing the reach that European and U.S. privacy law has on the rest 
of the world, how the emergence of rapid technological innovation shapes global data 
privacy, and how international data privacy law is likely to progress). 
 31 See Toluse Olorunnipa et al., Trump Revamps U.S. Trade Focus by Pulling Out of 
Pacific Deals, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017, 7:25 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-23/trump-said-to-sign-executive-
order-on-trans-pacific-pact-monday (showing the Trump presidency has taken an inward, 
protectionist approach. Within a week of taking office, President Trump has taken executive 
action to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and vowed to 
reevaluate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). 
 32 See Mark Scott, U.S. and Europe Fail to Meet Deadline for Data Transfer Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), at B1 (discussing how in the absence of an agreement between the 
European Union and the United States, companies are relying upon untested contractual 
measures to reduce liability in data transfers. Concerns over foreign legal remedies and the 
use of transferred data have highlighted key areas of concern and discrepancy between the 
foreign policies). 
 33 See also Eric Shimp, Data Privacy in the Transatlantic Trade Agreement? US-EU 
Ponder the Way Forward, ALSTON & BIRD: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. BLOG, 
http://www.alstonprivacy.com/data-privacy-in-the-transatlantic-trade-agreement-us-eu-
ponder-the-way-forward (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (discussing how data protection and 
privacy concerns have already arisen in T-TIP negotiations); see generally Ioanna 
Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-E.U. in Data Privacy Protection, 36 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 161 (2014) (discussing how an international lack of trust in the United 
States’ legal emphasis on privacy is threatening the negotiations for increased trade 
partnerships because separate agreements are necessary to protect the European Union’s 
fundamental right to privacy). 
 34 Jugpreet Mann, Small Steps for Congress, Huge Steps for Online Privacy, 37 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365, 388 (2015). 
 35 See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 429, 472-76 (1997) (discussing how the increasing globalization of trade and the 
importance of data collection serve as impetuses for the United States to adopt federal 
privacy standards to ease international data transfer relations); see also Amanda C. Border, 
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Part I of this Note provides an overview of the sectoral privacy law landscape 
currently in the United States. Part II discusses privacy law in the European 
Union and how its development of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) is creating a quasi-global standard for data protection. Part III forecasts 
the long-term impact that the GDPR and rising global data privacy standards 
will have on U.S. data privacy laws and international data transfers. 
Additionally, Part III argues that the FTC must promulgate a rule to create a 
uniform set of data standards across the states and form data compliance 
agencies to oversee domestic and international affairs. 
I. THE ROLE OF PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE U.S.  
Although the right to privacy is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, 
judicial and legislative interpretations have acknowledged that individuals have 
certain privacy rights.36 While this right has not been extended by the Court to 
protect private personal information (PII),37 several states have enumerated a 
right of consumer data and personal privacy within their constitutions.38 This 
attitude toward personal privacy rights has formed the basis for its protection in 
the United States.39 Rather than a preventative, singular rule of law, data 
protection in the United States is governed by a reactive patchwork regulatory 
system.40 Although federal statutes govern the protection of consumer data in 
                                                          
Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation in the 
United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363, 384 (proposing that “the 
United States should shift away from its “piecemeal approach” to data privacy.”). 
 36 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (demonstrating how the Supreme Court has 
relied on interpretations of the Bill of Rights to conclude that “a right of personal privacy, or 
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy [do] exist under the Constitution”); see also 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (developing a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test to gauge whether a person has a right to privacy, based on having (1) an actual 
expectation of privacy that (2) society deems reasonable and is prepared to recognize); see 
also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974) (noting that a “right to privacy is a 
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States”). 
 37 Tan, supra note 22, at 669. 
 38 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and 
shall not be infringed.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by their nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending liberty . . 
. and privacy.”). 
 39 See generally Tan, supra note 22, at 662-63 (noting that nearly every country 
recognizes a right to privacy; however, differences amongst comprehensive laws are 
apparent based on the level of emphasis that individual countries place on this right). 
 40 Ieuan Jolly, Data protection in the United States: overview, PRACTICAL L. (July 1, 
2017), http://us.practicallaw.com/6-502-0467 (emphasizing that rather than enacting a single 
federal law, the United States utilizes “a patchwork system of federal and state laws and 
regulations that can sometimes overlap, dovetail and contradict one another.”); see also Tan, 
supra note 22, at 671 (“Presently, there is no comprehensive law in the United States 
guaranteeing privacy rights in personal information. There are, however, various privacy 
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particular sectors, such as private health information,41 financial information,42 
and electronic communications,43 many industries fall outside the scope of these 
regulations.44 Instead, a system of company self-regulation governs consumer 
data protection in the United States.45 Privacy law in the U.S. is primarily 
enforced by the FTC46 and state privacy laws.47 
A. The FTC and its Role on Data Protection in the United States 
The FTC was not originally formed to function as a privacy protection 
agency; however, that is now one of its primary duties.48 The FTC’s mission 
                                                          
and security statutes that address specific privacy needs.”). 
 41 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1302(a) 
(2012) (explaining that the power to regulate the governing of privacy and medical 
regulations is given to the Department of Health and Human Services under the Act). 
 42 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012) (requiring privacy 
notice and opt-out rights for consumers when financial institutions attempt to share personal 
data with other companies). 
 43 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002) 
(protecting personal information on the Internet from unauthorized government 
surveillance). 
 44 Stephen Cobb, Data privacy and data protection: U.S. law and legislation, ESET 6 
(2016) (stating large sectors, such as airline reservation data, sales and marketing prospect 
databases, and library borrowing records fall outside the scope of federal privacy protection 
laws); see also Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC 
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2015) “The FTC has filled gaps when 
a number of large industries have not been regulated by federal data protection statutes.”. 
 45 Tan, supra note 22, at 674 (detailing how the United States’ regulatory system for 
online privacy protection consists of self-regulation where companies establish their own 
policies). 
 46 Jolly, supra note 40, at 1, 17 (“The FTC is the primary U.S. enforcer of national 
privacy laws” and “has brought many enforcement actions against companies failing to 
comply with posted privacy policies and for the unauthorized disclosure of personal data.”). 
 47 See id. at 3 (“There are many laws at the state level that regulate the collection and 
use of personal data.”); Cal. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (2018) (discussing the newly 
enacted California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 which demonstrates how privacy law is 
enforced on the state level by stating that “any consumer whose nonencrypted or 
nonredacted personal information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, 
theft, or disclosure as a result of a business’ violation of the duty to implement and maintain 
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to 
protect the personal information” may institute certain civil actions). 
 48 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)) (stating that the FTC was primarily formed to 
“prevent persons, partnerships, or Corporations . . . from using unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce”); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)) 
(showing that one of the primary purposes of the FTC was to prevent the acquisition of “the 
whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any 
2018] The Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law 85 
does not specifically address the protection of consumer data privacy; however, 
its power to pursue companies for unfair and deceptive practices now includes 
data practices.49 Modern interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTC Act) prohibit unfair or deceptive practices with regard to online and offline 
privacy, data security policies of the company, and the company’s failure to 
safeguard consumers’ personal information.50 While the FTC’s “unfair and 
deceptive” authority under § 5 of the FTC Act broadens the FTC’s jurisdiction 
and scope of authority,51 certain industries remain exempt.52 Only the FTC can 
enforce the FTC Act, and therefore, private causes of action are not possible.53 
Instead, the government and U.S. consumers must rely upon FTC orders to 
obtain injunctive remedies, and fine companies accordingly.54 While advocates 
                                                          
activity affecting commerce,” when the intention of the person seeking to acquire such 
assets was to lessen competition or to create a monopoly); Andrew Serwin, The Federal 
Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of 
Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 814-15 (2011) (explaining that the “FTC was 
originally created in 1914 in order to protect competition among businesses” and the 
establishment of the FTC occurred concurrently with the Clayton Act, which focused on 
antitrust law, to ensure that businesses operated on a level playing field). 
 49 See About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2016) (stating that the FTC’s mission is to prevent business practices that are 
“anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair” to consumers, to enhance “informed consumer 
choice and public understanding of the competitive process”, and to accomplish this 
“without unduly burdening legitimate business activity”); Division of Privacy and Identity 
Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-
consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-privacy-and-identity (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) 
(discussing that in response to growing concerns regarding data privacy, the FTC created a 
subdivision focused solely on data privacy issues). 
 50 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 814 (explaining that through amendments to section 5 
of the FTCA in 1938, “the FTCA was extended to cover consumers, primarily through the 
addition of authority to address unfair and deceptive acts or practices,” which has been 
interpreted to include safeguarding personal information); Jolly, supra note 40, at 1 (“The 
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) is a federal consumer protection law 
that prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to offline and online 
privacy and data security policies.”); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2235 (explaining 
how under the FTC Act, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful” and when companies fail to live up to promises made in their 
privacy policies, the FTC considers this a deceptive trade practice that can be prohibited 
under the Act). 
 51 See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (stating that 
under the relevant section of the act “unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared 
unlawful” and the FTC has the power to regulate said methods and practices). 
 52 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (explaining that examples of industries outside the scope of 
the FTC’s § 5 authority include financial institutions, airlines, non-profits, and 
telecommunications carriers, among others). 
 53 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFO. PRIVACY L. 848-49 (Erwin 
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015). 
 54 See Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009) (defining an injunction as 
“a court order commanding or preventing an action”); see 15 U.S.C. § 45 (l) (stating that 
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for the federal regulation of data privacy and security, separate from the FTC, 
have introduced numerous bills to Congress, such as the Personal Data Privacy 
and Security Act of 2014;55 the Data Security Act of 2014;56 and the Data 
Security Act of 2015,57 Congress continues to balk at passing federal data 
privacy legislation.58 Since the invalidation of the Safe Harbor Agreement, the 
United States’ only recourse to buffering its data privacy law regime has been 
through the enactment of the Judicial Redress Act of 2015,59 which primarily 
concerns government use of personal data.60 
                                                          
“any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission after it 
has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United 
States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to 
the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of 
the United States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense, 
except that in a case of a violation through continuing failure to obey or neglect to obey a 
final order of the Commission, each day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be 
deemed a separate offense. In such actions, the United States district courts are empowered 
to grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem 
appropriate in the enforcement of such final orders of the Commission”); see 15 U.S.C. § 53 
(explaining that “whenever the Commission has reason to believe . . . that any person, 
partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced 
by the Federal Trade [Commission] . . . may bring suit in a district court of the United States 
to enjoin any such act or practice,” with some limitations); see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 53 (describing how the FTC cannot subject first-time offending companies to fines 
under § 5. Instead, the FTC can only issue fines when a company violates an existing 
consent decree previously entered stemming from an earlier § 5 violation). 
 55 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2014) (describing the purpose of the bill was to “prevent and mitigate identity theft, to 
ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties, 
law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security breaches, fraudulent 
access, and misuse of personally identifiable information.”). 
 56 Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (stating the purpose 
of this bill was to “protect information relating to consumers, to require notice of security 
breaches, and for other purposes.”). 
 57 Data Security Act of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) (revising Data 
Security Act of 2014 but with the same stated purpose). 
 58 See J. Caleb Boggs III. & Lauren Donoghue, Congress taking action to protect data 
security, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5f0404e-d581-4911-aa50-eeea8921b60d; 
Conor Dougherty, Push for Internet Privacy Rules Moves to Statehouses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/technology/internet-privacy-state-
legislation-illinois.html. 
 59 Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (2016) (authorizing 
the Attorney General to designate foreign countries or specific organizations whose citizens 
may then bring civil suits under the Privacy Act of 1974 against certain U.S. government 
agencies for unlawful disclosures of records transferred from a foreign country pursuant to 
criminal prosecution). 
 60 Eric Geller, Everything You Need to Know About the Big New Data-Privacy Big in 
Congress, DAILY DOT (Feb. 24, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-
the-judicial-redress-act-europe-data-privacy-bill; H. Jacqueline Brehmer, Data Localization: 
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The FTC has developed accountability standards that delineate best practices 
for companies using consumer data within their specific industry.61 However, 
companies do not have to accept these practices due to their voluntary nature.62 
While the FTC can prescribe interpretive rules and general standards,63 it has 
minimal practical authority to make binding rules.64 From a practical standpoint, 
the FTC’s rulemaking authority is a highly burdensome procedural process 
known as Magnuson-Moss65 authority.66 Due to this burdensome process, the 
FTC has not used its rulemaking power in over thirty-two years, leaving 
companies and industries with general policy statements and interpretive rules.67 
Companies that accept these standards are accountable to the FTC and are liable 
for acts or practices deemed unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act.68 Non-
                                                          
The Unintended Consequences of Privacy Litigation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 941-42 (2018) 
(stating the Judicial Redress Act expands civil redress of surveillance by federal agencies to 
foreign nationals). 
 61 THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY L. REV. 148 (Alan Charles 
Raul ed. 2014) (explaining these standards have led to best practices like the opt-out for 
cookies and the “about advertising” icon); see Privacy & Data Security Update (2016), FTC, 
Oct. 22, 2018, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016#rules 
(detailing the FTC’s various discussions and reports on how businesses should operate to 
protect consumer data under the “Consumer Education and Business Guidance” section). 
 62 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61. 
 63 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2006) (granting 
the FTC power to prescribe interpretive rules and general statements of policy, but not those 
regarding “the regulation of the development and utilization of the standards and 
certification activities pursuant to this section”). 
 64 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (stating that the “Commission shall have no authority under 
this subchapter, other than its authority under this section, to prescribe any rule with respect 
to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of 
section 45(a)(1) of this title)”). 
 65 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act – Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. 
L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (affirming the FTC’s legislative authority to make 
rules, subject to first conducting an industry wide investigation, preparing draft staff reports, 
proposing a rule, and engaging in a series of public hearings, including cross-examination). 
 66 Beth DeSimone & Amy Mudge, Is Congress Putting the FTC on Steroids?, SELLER 
BEWARE BLOG (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2010/04/is-
congress-putting-the-ftc-on-steroids.html; see also Magdalena Gathani, Internet of Things 
Report: The FTC Overstepped its Agency Rulemaking Authority, 9 BUS. PUBL. ADMIN. 
STUD. 27, 27-8 (2016), https://www.bpastudies.org/bpastudies/article/viewFile/203/380 
(describing the FTC’s current rulemaking authority, and how some view the issuing of best 
practices and recommendations as overstepping the FTC’s authority). 
 67 Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Association of 
National Advertisers: Advertising Law and Public Policy Conference (Mar. 18, 2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/association-national-
advertisers-advertising-law-and-public-policy-conference-prepared-
delivery/100318nationaladvertisers.pdf (“The requirements to promulgate a rule under [the 
Magnuson-Moss Act] are so onerous that the agency has not proposed a new [Magnuson-
Moss Act] rule in 32 years.”). 
 68 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61; Cases and Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (showing 
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compliant acts or practices include inadequate protection of consumer personal 
data, failure to post or comply with company privacy policies, and lack of notice 
for privacy policy revisions.69 The FTC uses two models to promote consumer 
privacy: (1) a notice-and-choice model, characterized by the fair information 
practice principles70 (2) and a harm-based approach.71 
In 2000, the FTC first used the notice-and-choice model in an effort to have 
Congress require businesses to comply with the Fair Information Practice 
Principles.72 The FTC proposed that Congress enact several substantive 
principles to promote consumer privacy in organizational processes, including 
“data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention and disposal 
practices, and data accuracy.”73 Though unsuccessful in convincing Congress to 
enact legislation to cover this area, the FTC has used its authority under Section 
45 of the FTC Act to promote consumer data protection.74 
Section 45 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair and deceptive practices.75 
Deceptive practices are found when there is a “material” misleading 
representation, practice, or omission, when viewed from the perspective of a 
                                                          
all actions filed by the FTC against corporations under its Section five authority, including 
those specifically for privacy violation; see, e.g., Atl. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 381 
U.S. 357, 367 (1965) (finding that ‘unfair practices’ is a flexible and evolving concept, best 
left to FTC interpretation so that it may bring future suits to hold companies accountable for 
their actions). 
 69 Jolly, supra note 40. 
 70 Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum from Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on The Fair Information Practice Principles: Framework for 
Privacy Policy (on file with author) (describing the Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs) that govern the use of personally identifiable information (PII) are: Transparency, 
Individual Participation, Purpose Specification, Data Minimization, Use Limitation, Data 
Quality and Integrity, Security, and Accountability and Auditing. The memorandum 
elaborates on the meaning of each principle). 
 71 Serwin, supra note 48, at 817-22 (discussing the evolution of the FTC’s role in 
policing the right to privacy. The right to protection of privacy and information security was 
not a reasoning for the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act. § 5 of the FTC Act 
embraced privacy issues as another way for the FTC to combat unfair and deceptive 
practices). 
 72 FTC Staff Report on Internet of things: Privacy & Security in a connecting world, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, at v (Jan. 2015). 
 73 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at i, vii (2012). 
 74 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to 
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition 
in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2017, at 1-8 
(2017) (citing lawsuits and enforcement actions brought by the FTC in 2017 to protect 
consumer data privacy both domestically and abroad). 
 75 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
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reasonably acting consumer.76 When examining the consumer’s likely detriment 
upon reliance of a deceptive act or practice, there is often a presumption of injury 
and actual harm.77 Under this model, deception serves as the basis for the FTC’s 
authority to regulate consumer privacy protection in all industries not 
specifically targeted by federal law.78 Under Section 45, the FTC is able to bring 
actions against companies for using deceptive practices. There are two ways in 
which the FTC can bring suit: (1) either on its own or (2) upon referrals, from 
either E.U. data protection authorities or third-party private dispute resolution 
providers.79 Critics have claimed that this notice and choice enforcement model 
is impractical because it results in implementations of lengthy, incomprehensible 
privacy statements which do not benefit consumers, and are not responsive to a 
rapidly changing technological environment.80 
The FTC has adopted the harm-based approach as the primary enforcement 
model.81 This model shifts from a focus on deception to a focus on unfairness, 
where an emphasis is placed on the likelihood of substantial injury rather than 
on business practices.82 Application of the harm-based enforcement model has 
resulted in the development of four privacy tort causes of action: (1) intrusion 
upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of name or likeness; (3) public disclosure of 
private facts; and (4) dissemination of false information.83 This privacy tort 
cause of action model has been criticized for its inability to address all potential 
privacy harms and to adapt to the evolving technological environment.84 The 
following subsections detail the FTC’s roles in data privacy and protection as 
                                                          
 76 Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, responding to 
an inquiry on FTC enforcement policy for deceptive acts and practices from Congressman 
John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Comm. on Energy Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) (on 
file with author), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstm
t.pdf. 
 77 Id. 
 78 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 79 Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows: 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the Subcomm. on 
Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 21 (2015) 
(statement of Dr. Joshua P. Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development 
program at the Brookings Institute). 
 80 Serwin, supra note 48, at 816; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73, at 2. 
 81 Serwin, supra note 48, at 842-43. 
 82 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) in explaining that “[t]o be ‘unfair,’ a practice must be one 
that ‘[1] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers [2] which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”). 
 83 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 288. 
 84 Serwin, supra note 48, at 816-20. 
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(1) a self-regulating body and (2) a foreign ambassador for data privacy.85 
1. The FTC as a Self-Regulating Body 
In a legal landscape riddled with gaps, the FTC rules have been compared to 
a privacy common law.86 Though the law does not require companies to enact 
specific practices or privacy policies, the FTC can use its authority under Section 
45 to bring actions against companies for unfair and deceptive practices.87 The 
FTC can only bring suits against companies for Section 45 violations, which 
reduces the number of claims filed.88 Additionally, the majority of FTC cases 
against companies end in settlements or consent decrees to cease deceptive and 
unfair practices.89 While both parties benefit, it does not establish a privacy law 
foundation, based on case law nor establish precedent for future actions.90 
Instead, the FTC develops its power by relying on past settlements and practices 
to enforce its authority and to ensure that companies cease unfair and deceptive 
practices.91 Companies have responded by developing their own state-of-the-art 
privacy practices beyond the scope of the FTC’s requirements and more closely 
                                                          
 85 See infra Sub-subsections I(A)(1), (2). 
 86 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586-88 (2014) (analyzing the FTC as a common law 
because it acts as the primary regulatory system for privacy within the United States); see 
also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3rd Cir. 2015) (explaining that 
FTC may deem a practice unfair without needing to support finding with privacy common 
law when the practice causes substantial injury to customers). 
 87 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 600-04 (describing that as more regulatory 
schemes develop within various industries, the FTC receives additional authority to ensure 
that companies continue to operate under these principles in addition to the baseline 
protections already set by the FTC). 
 88 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53. 
 89 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 604-64 (describing perhaps the biggest reason 
why companies seek to avoid court and to abide by the FTC is because Congressional action 
may occur if the FTC proves to be inadequate.); see also Shulamit Shvartsman, To Settle or 
Not to Settle? That Is the Question, LAWYERS.COM, http://research.lawyers.com/to-settle-or-
not-to-settle-that-is-the-question.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (explaining companies do 
not like to go to court because of high costs, bad publicity, wasted time, and the possibility 
for an admission of guilt). 
 90 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 588-89; Christina Ma, Into the Amazon: Clarity 
and Transparency in FTC Section 5 Merger Doctrine, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953, 954 
(2013). 
 91 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 588-89 (illustrating that critics argue that the 
FTC has acted beyond its intended scope, resulting in a disposal of due process and legal 
constraints); see also Now in Its 100th year, the FTC Has Become the Federal Technology 
Commission, TECHFREEDOM (Sept. 26, 2013),  http://techfreedom.org/now-in-its-100th-
year-the-ftc-has-become-the/ (showing that coupled with a lack of rulemaking authority, the 
FTC’s lack of binding precedent creates a regulatory regime based on discretionary 
exercises of power unbound by legal principles). 
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aligned to stricter global standards.92 Companies anticipate future FTC actions 
and regulations, resulting in increased consumer-oriented protections, as 
opposed to compliance-oriented procedures.93 In the United States, industries 
have embraced this self-regulating system because it does not mandate the 
stringent privacy standards found in data laws of the European Union and across 
the globe.94 
2. FTC as an Ambassador 
While the FTC is the main privacy power in the United States, Section 45 of 
the FTC Act restrains the FTC from expanding its jurisdiction to direct actions 
against international organizations, absent extreme circumstances.95 According 
to the FTC Act, unfair or deceptive practices involving foreign commerce must 
rise to the level that they “cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable 
injury within the United States,”96 or must “involve material conduct occurring 
within the United States.”97 If international jurisdiction is found, the FTC can 
use any available remedy for unfair or deceptive acts, including restitution to 
relieve victims both domestic and abroad.98 
The FTC also serves as an ambassador to discuss data privacy law with 
foreign nations.99 In this capacity, the FTC is able to resolve disagreements 
between foreign leaders over privacy standard issues and sign memoranda of 
understanding to memorialize those agreements.100 These memoranda of 
                                                          
 92 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 269-70 (2011) (stating how companies have become 
increasingly proactive in ensuring international privacy compliance by adopting European 
standards, which provide for the highest level of consumer data protection); see, e.g., 
Amazon Privacy Notice, 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468496 (last updated 
Aug. 29, 2017) (outlining Amazon’s robust privacy policy, including the corporation’s 
participation in “EU-US and Swiss-US Privacy Shield frameworks”). 
 93 See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 92, at 273. 
 94 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 593-94. 
 95 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 821 (explaining that the FTC can expand its jurisdiction 
into the international context only when needed to “prevent unfair methods of competition 
involving commerce with foreign nations unless the competition has a direct, substantial 
effect on U.S. commerce.” The FTC can investigate and report to Congress on business 
conducts and foreign trade conditions that affect United States’ commerce, but the FTC 
cannot take significant action against these foreign entities unless there are direct, 
substantial effects on commerce); see also Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41, 45(a), 46 (establishing the FTC, outlining the prohibition on various unfair 
business practices and granting the Commission regulatory authority). 
 96 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A)(i). 
 97 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
 98 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(B). 
 99 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 280. 
 100 Id. at 280-81. 
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understanding are made between the FTC, as a representative of the United 
States, and a foreign nation’s governing privacy body, to recognize and reconcile 
privacy law differences.101 Because the United States’ view on privacy is in 
sharp contrast to that of its largest trade partner, the European Union, these 
memoranda are essential in dealing with European Union Member States.102 For 
example, unlike the European Union, the United States does not place significant 
governmental restrictions in the international transfer of data.103 In response, the 
FTC assumes the role of ensuring that companies under its jurisdiction comply 
with more stringent global standards.104 
Safe Harbor violations in particular have been a top priority for international 
policy actions.105 The FTC will continue to serve this role under the Privacy 
Shield.106 Though the FTC has evolved into a broad privacy protection 
regulatory agency, it alone is insufficient to ensure the vitality of data transfers 
between the United States and the European Union.107 
                                                          
 101 Id. at 281 (describing that these memoranda are “designed to promote increased 
cooperation and communication in both agencies’ efforts to protect consumer privacy.” The 
FTC has signed multiple memoranda of understanding including one with Ireland’s Office 
of the Data Protection Commission in June 2013, and with the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office in March 2014. Without such memoranda, certain nations are 
unwilling to participate in data transfers because they are hesitant of any nation’s privacy 
protections that are not “adequate” in the eyes of the European Union). 
 102 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Federal Trade 
Commission and the Information Commissioner’s Office of the United Kingdom on Mutual 
Assistance in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Personal Information in the Private 
Sector, U.K.-U.S., Mar. 6, 2014, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/international-competition-consumer-
protection-cooperation-agreements/140306ftc-uk-mou.pdf (agreeing to enforce across 
borders, due to the “increase in the flow of personal information across borders [and] the 
increasing complexity and pervasiveness of information technologies.”). 
 103 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 280. 
 104 Id. at 280-81 (explaining that the FTC has an Office of International Affairs, which 
“works with competition and consumer protection agencies around the world to promote 
cooperation and convergence toward best practices.”); see also Randolph W. Tritell, Office 
of International Affairs, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/office-international-affairs (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
 105 See, e.g., Thirteen Companies Agree to Settle FTC Charges They Falsely Claimed to 
Comply with International Safe Harbor Framework, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 17, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/08/thirteen-companies-agree-settle-
ftc-charges-they-falsely-claimed. 
 106 See Privacy Shield, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/privacy-and-security/privacy-shield (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) (stating, “[the] FTC 
has committed to make enforcement of the [Privacy Shield] Framework a high priority”). 
 107 See generally Brookman, supra note 11; see also Julian Hattem, Rep. Issa takes aim 
at FTC ‘inquisitions,’ THE HILL (July 24, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://origin-
nyi.thehill.com/policy/technology/213242-issa-takes-aim-at-ftc-inquisitions (accusing the 
FTC of overstepping its boundaries in pursuing companies for privacy violations because, 
absent notice about the precise way a company should secure data, there is no way for 
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B. State Privacy Laws 
Federal privacy laws address certain industries; however, the majority of 
consumer privacy protection laws are individualized at the state level, with 
California setting the standard.108 Many states have begun to incorporate privacy 
as a core right by amending their state constitutions to enumerate individual 
rights to privacy.109 States have also responded to the increased demands for 
privacy by enacting data breach laws that require notification to consumers in 
the event of data security breaches involving personal information.110 Minnesota 
and Nevada have even gone so far as to protect consumer personal information 
by barring internet service providers from knowingly disclosing PII to third 
parties.111 Even without privacy statutes, state attorneys general retain similar 
powers from the FTC to prohibit unfair or deceptive trade practices.112 
Increasingly, states have begun to embed a fundamental right to privacy within 
their legislation, including how such rights should be protected.113 However, 
                                                          
businesses to tell if they are abiding by their stated security procedures). 
 108 CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2008); Jolly, supra note 40 (explaining that California was 
the first state to enact a data breach notification law, which generally requires that “any 
person or business that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal 
information to disclose any breach of the security of the system to all California residents 
whose unencrypted personal information was acquired by an unauthorized person.”). 
 109 E.g., Ariz. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1911) (“No person shall be disturbed in his private 
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); see also 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-
28.1 (2018) (“It is the policy of this state that every person in this state shall have a right to 
privacy…”); see also Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NCSL (May 5, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-
protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx (including a list of the ten states that have 
incorporated the right to privacy into their state constitutions and these provisions). 
 110 Jolly, supra note 40 (“As of April 2016, 47 states, as well as the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands all have enacted laws requiring notification of 
security breaches involving personal information.”); Stephen Embry, State data breach 
notification laws just got crazier, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/may-2016/state-data-breach-
notification-laws-just-got-crazier.html (discussing how many state data breach notification 
laws are confusing, contradictory, and difficult to comply with for companies operating 
under multiple state data breach notification laws). 
 111 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325M.02 (2003) (“Except as provided in sections 325M.03 and 
325M.04, an Internet service provider may not knowingly disclose personally identifiable 
information concerning a consumer of the Internet service provider.”); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 205.498 (1999) (providing when an Internet service provider shall keep consumer 
personal information confidential). 
 112 Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair 
or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 
209, 212 (2016); THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 285. 
 113 Petrina McDaniel & Keshia Lipscomb, Data Breach Laws on the Books in Every 
State; Federal Data Breach Law Hangs in the Balance, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Apr. 30, 
2018), https://www.securityprivacybytes.com/2018/04/data-breach-laws-on-the-books-in-
every-state-federal-data-breach-law-hangs-in-the-balance (discussing how all 50 states have 
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state privacy laws are narrow in scale and do not adequately establish standards 
for data protection, collection, monitoring, or use.114 Though states have begun 
to emphasize and enforce data privacy, this process is too slow and sporadic to 
create a legal scheme in the United States that can adequately comply with rising 
international standards.115 
C. Why the United States’ System is Unsustainable and Ineffective  
Critics of the United States’ privacy law regime believe that the reactive, 
patchwork system is unsustainable in a world where technology and privacy 
concerns are continuously developing.116 Through the FTC, the United States 
has pursued privacy protection as an unfair or deceptive practice rather than as 
a separate area of concern.117 Under this method, companies are able to avoid 
privacy concerns by not following the voluntary best practices.118 New 
businesses are able to circumvent federal regulatory and FTC provisions under 
the United States privacy model.119 This situation becomes a cost-benefit 
analysis for companies where they must determine whether the potential loss on 
                                                          
laws and some worry a federal law may interfere with the States if not structured 
effectively). 
 114 Cory Bennett, Lawmakers see momentum for data breach legislation, THE HILL (Jan. 
27, 2015, 12:34 PM.), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/230867-data-breach-bill-is-
achievable-goal (indicating that while states have begun to dabble in creating data privacy 
and protection rights, the inherent nature of data to freely flow throughout the world calls 
for a greater encompassing approach to its governance). 
 115 Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, 
COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-
data-protection. 
 116 Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Reconciling Personal Information in the 
United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 897-900 (2014); O’Connor, 
supra note 115. 
 117 Brookman, supra note 11, at 358-59; see also Hattem, supra note 107 (discussing 
how critics argue that the “unfair and deceptive practices” authority is overly broad and 
should not address privacy matters because there is no substantive standard practice to 
follow that provides guidance on whether or not companies are properly securing data). 
 118 Brookman, supra note 11, at 359 (illustrating that “it would be challenging to argue 
that failure to provide access and correction rights constitutes a deceptive practice (as no 
deception occurs) or that failure to offer users control of their data is unfair (as no 
substantial harm is likely to occur), and consumers could avoid any potential harm by 
merely not using the service.” Under this scheme, you can only be accountable if you decide 
that it is worth providing for consumer data protections rather than simply disregarding the 
subject). 
 119 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978 (stating the United States’ system for regulating 
information privacy allows companies the freedom to innovate new data processing, 
storage, and mining techniques. Though this can have positive effects on technological 
development, it can also allow businesses to niche themselves into regulatory gaps to “test 
new innovative practices or find new ways to violate privacy.”). 
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consumer trust outweighs the potential costs from implementing, complying 
with, and reconciling for violations of self-mandated privacy promises.120 On an 
international basis, the FTC’s limited jurisdiction weakens its international 
presence and authority.121 While the FTC has sufficed so far, the evolving 
technological and global landscape outpaces the FTC’s ability to remain 
effective as the United States’ primary privacy law enforcer.122 
Critics of the state privacy law system in the U.S. argue that this reactive 
approach causes inconsistencies, thus resulting in information remaining 
unprotected.123 For companies this creates a potential for liability; if companies 
operate on a national or international scale, staying in compliance with 
individual jurisdiction requires monumental efforts.124 Without these barriers to 
international transfers, companies would be able to rapidly expand into 
international markets, which could stimulate economic spending and job 
growth.125 Instead, the potential risks and associated costs adversely impact the 
growth of trade amongst nations because companies, in their cost-benefit 
analyses, cannot conclude that the most efficient allocation of wealth is worth 
the price of trade.126 
On the other hand, proponents of the United States’ approach to privacy 
counter that this individualized structure promotes cooperation in the pursuit of 
companies that fail to sufficiently protect individuals’ rights to privacy.127 Even 
                                                          
 120 Morey et al., supra note 7 (illustrating that consumer trust, particularly through 
transparency of business practices has become increasingly important to consumers’ buying 
behaviors. Especially now that technological innovations have catalyzed data transfer and 
collection, business must invest more heavily in compliance and data security or risk losing 
the trust of their consumers). 
 121 Schwartz, supra note 21, at1977-78 (observing that the United States lacks a 
commission to oversee international data transfers, which allows for limitless exportation of 
individual data by companies to third countries. The FTC attempts to fill this role by 
monitoring international data sharing, however, can only do so under its unfair and 
deceptive practices authority and not as a limiting agency). 
 122 Id. at 1978-79; see also Marc Rotenberg, In support of a data protection board in the 
United States, 8 GOV’T INFO. Q. 79-94 (1991) (positing a proposal to create a federal privacy 
agency in the United States to better allow the United States to respond to the rapidly 
changing, global data privacy landscape). 
 123 Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy Law, 
TEACH PRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoral-approach-
privacy-law. 
 124 COBB, supra note 44, at 8-9 (discussing an example of how a lack of consistency in 
law has affected the legality of Stingrays, a data technology used by United States law 
enforcement agencies. Further contemplates whether the government can use this 
technology to conduct pre-emptive surveillance on suspected terrorists). 
 125 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-44 (1960) (advancing 
the theory that, absent transaction costs, those operating within the economy will always 
pursue the course of action most effective in allocating wealth). 
 126 Id. 
 127 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 285 (describing the benefits of having state privacy 
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if increased cooperation exists, critics contend that state laws will remain 
ineffective because they often conflict with one another or, at times, are subject 
to federal law preemption.128 Furthermore, state laws are subject to 
constitutional challenges, which have invalidated state privacy laws.129 Despite 
speculation regarding the ineffectiveness of the approach adopted by the United 
States, it has not taken any progressive steps toward an omnibus approach to 
privacy, as most countries have done.130 
In the United States, courts have been reluctant to grant relief for petitioners 
by claiming a breach of privacy.131 Often, courts dismiss data breach claims due 
to a lack of standing based on insufficient evidence of direct or actual harm.132 
As Stephen Cobb, an advocate for universal privacy rights argues, “commercial 
data controllers culpable in breach can argue that there is no harm to the subject 
whose records have been exposed, unless they suffer a financial loss directly 
                                                          
laws as opposed to overarching federal laws – it requires “increased cooperation and 
coordination in enforcement” between the FTC and state Attorneys General, which 
strengthens FTC actions against unfair and deceptive practices). 
 128 Jolly, supra note 40 (contending that federal government and state governments often 
conflict with one another regarding privacy law, where one sets higher standards than the 
other, making it difficult for companies to know which laws to comply with. For example, 
while federal law regarding the regulation of commercial e-mails preempts many state laws 
on the same topic, state laws are the standard to follow with privacy concerning medical or 
health records). 
 129 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1976-77 (expressing that data processors have 
successfully challenged state information privacy laws because the sharing of information is 
a constitutionally protected right of the freedom of expression); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659-60 (2011) (invalidating a Vermont law that stopped “detailers” from 
selling, disclosing, and using pharmaceutical records for identification of doctors to target 
market specific pharmaceuticals). 
 130 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53 (explaining omnibus approaches can create 
expansive catch-all provisions that provide general privacy guidelines to address any 
regulatory areas or issues not previously accounted for. Though countries adopting an 
omnibus approach still use sectoral privacy provisions, their presence is to supplement a 
standard minimum based on the requirements of a certain industry); see also Brookman, 
supra note 11, at 367-68 (portraying Congress’ primary efforts towards promoting federal 
privacy legislation as focusing on data breach notification, however, forty-seven states 
already address this concern); see also Data protection across the world, MEDIUM (Jan. 30, 
2018), https://medium.com/@privacyint/data-protection-across-the-world-fe66ca1e138f 
(discussing the approaches toward data privacy that Argentina, China, and India have 
taken). 
 131 COBB, supra note 44, at 7-8; In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape 
Data Theft Litig., 45 F.Supp.3d 14, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2014) (stating increased risk of injury is 
not enough to confer standing and grant relief). 
 132 Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F.Supp.3d 524, 534 (D. Md. 2016) 
(explaining how the plaintiff did not “allege an injury in fact as required to establish Article 
III standing” given the complaint did not allege an actual misuse of personal data, and thus 
the district court dismissed the claim due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
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attributable to the breach.”133 For example, standing is hard to establish in data 
breach cases without evidence of pecuniary loss, but it is even harder to prevail 
when standing is granted based on alleged future harm.134 Standing in data 
breach claims rests upon three theories: “(a) existing financial injuries[;] (b) 
actual misuse of information that may fall short of specific financial injuries[;] 
and (c) the alleged near-term risk of the misuse of information.”135 The first two 
theories, actual financial harm and actual misuse of information, are sufficient 
to establish standing.136 However, the majority of data breach cases rely upon 
speculative future harm, absent evidence of pecuniary losses.137 To assess 
standing for speculative harm, U.S. courts have looked at the underlying 
circumstances of the breach and the length of time passed since the breach 
occurred without incident.138 While United States’ courts are reluctant to grant 
standing based upon allegations of possible risk of future harms, foreign courts 
are beginning to recognize the severity of potential harm inherent in data 
breaches.139 
In the United States, companies can get privacy and data breach claims 
dismissed based on assertions of a lack of standing due to no injury.140 However, 
at an international level, courts are transitioning toward allowing standing in tort 
privacy claims without showing of pecuniary harm.141 For example, between 
                                                          
 133 COBB, supra note 44, at 7-8 (noting that other countries, such as Canada, have begun 
to apply the tort cause of action “intrusion upon seclusion” to data breach cases). 
 134 See, e.g. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 
(2000) (stating that plaintiffs must establish standing through a showing that “(1) it has 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of 
the  defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”); COBB, supra note 44, at 7-8 (stating absent an actual 
pecuniary loss, courts have been hesitant to agree that an “injury in fact” has occurred and 
that it is imminent to occur based on the dissemination of data). 
 135 Robert D. Fram et al., Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/09/standing_in_data_breach_cases.pdf. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. (stating, “the most commonly alleged injury . . . is an increased risk of future 
identity theft.”). 
 138 Id. (stating that the courts evaluate factors such as the likelihood of actual harm and 
the length of time between the data breach and litigation); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. 
Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.Supp.3d at 20-21 (stating, “an attenuated chain of 
possibilities does not confer standing”). 
 139 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1156-60 (2013) (holding 
that plaintiffs did not establish standing because there was no threatened imminent injury or 
concretely traceable injury resulting from the implementation of Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978). 
 140 Fram et al., supra note 135 (stating that courts usually agree with companies moving 
to dismiss because an increased risk from a breach is insufficient for standing). 
 141 Lisa R. Lifshitz, A New Tort Is Born! Ontario Recognizes its First Privacy Tort, BUS. 
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2011 and 2012, allegations arose that Google circumvented consumer Safari 
privacy settings to allow for the installation of data tracking cookies.142 Then, 
Google sold the data collected from the cookies to third-party companies to use 
in direct marketing campaigns towards individual consumers.143 While Google 
obtained settlements in the United States,144 on June 12, 2013, the United 
Kingdom’s Master of the Rolls permitted three claimants, domiciled in England, 
to serve Google at its principal place of business in Mountain View, 
California.145 On January 16, 2014, the High Court of Justice in Strand, London 
ruled that the claims for tortious misuse of private information and breach of the 
Data Protection Act of 1998 were triable issues and that jurisdiction was 
proper.146 Coupled with a willingness to apply long arm statutes to allow 
international citizens to serve United States based companies, more of these 
                                                          
L. TODAY (Mar. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2012/ 
03/keeping-current-new-tort-born-201203.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing how Ontario 
recently recognized that privacy torts for data breaches exist); Halley v. McCann, 2016 
CanLII 58945 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.) (awarding damages for a breach of privacy claim and 
acknowledging that invasion of privacy torts in Ontario do not require proof of pecuniary 
loss or any sort of economic harm); Jones v. Tsige, (2012) 108 O.R. (3d) 241 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.). 
 142 Doug Drinkwater, Google-Vidal Hall “opens the floodgates” to data breach 
compensation, SC MAG. UK (May 15, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/google-vidal-
hall-opens-the-floodgates-to-data-breach-compensation/article/414910. 
 143 Id.; see generally Duhigg, supra note 6 (explaining how companies conduct target 
marketing and the types of consumer information used to develop predictive targeting of 
advertisement). 
 144 Omer Tene, The European Privacy Judicial Decision of a Decade: Google v. Vidal-
Hall, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Apr. 2, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-european-
privacy-judicial-decision-of-a-decade-google-v-vidal-hall (stating “Google settled with the 
Federal Trade Commission and state attorney general in the U.S. for more than $22 million 
and $17 million respectively.”); THE PRIVACY, supra note 61 (explaining when the Google 
Safari cookie scandal occurred, Google settled with 37 states for $17 million); A.G. 
Schneiderman Announces $17 Million Multistate Settlement with Google Over Tracking of 
Consumers, N.Y. ST. ATT’Y GEN. (Nov. 18, 2013) (on file with author), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-17-million-multistate-
settlement-google-over-tracking (explaining that Google entered into a $17 million 
multistate settlement agreement “concerning its unauthorized placement of cookies on 
computers using Apple Safari Web browsers during 2011 and 2012”). 
 145 Vidal-Hall v. Google [2015] EWCA (Civ) 311, [6], (Eng.); Greg Palmer, UK – 
Google v Vidal-Hall: A green light for compensation claims?, LINKLATERS (June 15, 2015),  
https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/publications/tmt-news/tmt-news—-june-2015/uk—-
google-v-vidal-hall-a-green-light-for-compensation-claims (concluding that claimants 
received permission to serve Google, Inc. under the United Kingdom’s long arm statute on 
the grounds that Google had committed the tort of misuse of private information, with the 
damages occurring within the United Kingdom and for breach of provisions in the Data 
Protection Act 1988); see also Principal Place of Business, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
(10th ed. 2009). 
 146 Vidal-Hall v. Google [2014] EWHC (QB) 13; Drinkwater, supra note 142. 
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types of actions will arise as international standards continue to develop.147 
United States data privacy law is a sectoral scheme that reacts to egregious 
changes in public policy and on a case-by-case basis.148 The FTC is the United 
States’ primary regulatory body for data protection and privacy; however, the 
FTC was not founded with the intention of occupying this field of law.149 
Because the FTC’s authority relies upon its unfair-and-deceptive-practices 
power under Section 45 of the FTC Act, the FTC’s power only extends to the 
poor practices of individual companies.150 While there have been proposals to 
Congress that would create a federal data privacy statute or data protection 
board, none have yet to pass through both the Senate and the House.151 Overall, 
the United States’ approach to data privacy law is in stark contrast with the 
European Union, therefore Congress must reconcile these differences to avoid 
greater future consequences.152 
II. DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Unlike in the United States, the European Union embraces a fundamental 
right of privacy for citizens, both online and offline.153 While the United States 
views data protection as the broad concept of general privacy, the European 
Union narrows its view to specifically protect citizen rights from “the collection 
and processing of personal data.”154 Unlike the American system for privacy 
protection, the European Union proactively seeks to strengthen privacy 
protection—both internally and externally, when dealing with non-European 
                                                          
 147 Lifshitz, supra note 141, at 2 (discussing how Ontario recently recognized that 
privacy torts for data breaches exist among companies that do business in Canada). 
 148 Cameron F. Kerry, Filling the Gaps in US Data Privacy Laws, BROOKINGS INST. 
(July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/12/filling-the-gaps-in-u-
s-data-privacy-laws. 
 149 Serwin, supra note 48, at 811. 
 150 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 275. 
 151 Boggs & Donoghue, supra note 58; see, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act 
of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); Data Security Act of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). 
 152 See infra Part III. 
 153 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, Oct. 26, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 393, 397 (explaining Article 7 concerns the right to respect for private and 
family life where “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications.”. Article 8 concerns the protection of personal data where 
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”). 
 154 Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. 
L. J. 461, 470 (2000) (stating the United States uses the term “privacy” to address a wide 
range of issues, ranging from the right to an abortion, the lack of security cameras within a 
dressing room, to voter confidentiality. This disparity between views is why Americans are 
less concerned with data protection security: they think of privacy as an overarching, 
general concept rather than as a singular issue). 
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Union countries.155 European Union consumers are also given greater power in 
limiting what data they expose to the world with a “right to be forgotten.”156 The 
European Union’s proactive approach towards personal privacy protection has 
made it the global leader in privacy law and data security.157  
A. The Data Protection Directive 
On October 24, 1995, the European Parliament adopted the Data Protection 
Directive (DPD) 95/46/EC, the European Union’s primary source for data 
protection law, “to ensure that the level of protection of the rights and freedoms 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is equivalent in all 
Member States.”158 The DPD also extends beyond Member State borders by 
providing data protection adequacy requirements to companies located in third 
world countries.159 Under the DPD, Member States have the ability to impose 
                                                          
 155 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 29, at 118 (exploring the differences in data protection 
between the European Union and the United States where the former takes a broad, 
proactive approach and the latter is reactive to specific crises). 
 156 David Streitfeld, European Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/technology/google-should-erase-web-
links-to-some-personal-data-europes-highest-court-says.html?_r=0 (explaining the decision 
of the European Union to allow consumers to have the right to make search engines erase 
certain links to webpages upends traditional notions of free flows of information); see also 
Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 161, 169-72 (2012) (finding in the United States, First Amendment 
issues arise grounded on the belief of a contradiction to the fundamental protections for 
freedom of speech and press). 
 157 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1974-79 (explaining how the E.U. has embraced an 
“Omnibus” approach to privacy laws that sets a minimum standard for privacy protection 
amongst its Member States with incentives for states to both incorporate, and strengthen, its 
concepts. This omnibus method has shaped future privacy laws for nations a part of, and 
external to, the European Union). 
 158 S.T.S., Nov. 24, 2011 (Spain), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0468&from=EN (defining personal data as 
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”); O.E.C.D., Recommendation 
of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, (as amended on July 10, 1980), 
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/114 (describing how the Directive enforces 
a minimum standard on privacy protection laws within the European Union, based upon the 
1980 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Recommendations 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD 
Guidelines), which set forth recommended, non-binding privacy principles for countries to 
abide by). 
 159 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1972-73. 
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stricter privacy protection standards than what the DPD requires.160 The DPD 
requires that the processing of personal data occur only when: 
[T]he data subject has unambiguously given his/her consent; processing 
is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject 
is a party, for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller 
is subject, to protect the vital interests of the data subject, or it is in the 
public interest.161 
By providing minimum standards for data processing across its Member States, 
the European Union ensures that it protects its citizens’ fundamental right to 
privacy.162 This protection is enforceable both within the European Union and 
against third-party countries participating in international data transfers.163 
Prior to the adoption of the DPD, the structure of the European Union’s 
system for privacy protection resembled that of the United States.164 In contrast, 
while the United States remained content with this approach to data privacy, the 
European Union sought to set a standard minimum level of protection amongst 
all of its Member States.165 Even though the majority of the countries previously 
had broad data protection laws, the European Union used the DPD to ensure that 
                                                          
 160 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 5, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=En (explaining that individual 
member states must adhere to the minimum levels of privacy protection standards set forth 
in the DPD, however, states have the authority to “determine more precisely the conditions 
under which the processing of personal data is lawful.”). 
 161 Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows: 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the Subcomm. on 
Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 21 (2015) 
(statement of Dr. Joshua P. Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development 
program at the Brookings Institute); 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 6, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=En (stating 
that data processors must prove the quality of any personal data processed, where it must be: 
“(a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. . .; (c) 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date . . .; (e) kept in a 
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed”). 
 162 See Fromholz, supra note 154, at 468-69. 
 163 See id. at 468 n.40. 
 164 See id. at 468. 
 165 See id. (explaining the European Commission headed this effort by directing member 
countries to make data protection a fundamental right, to create independent supervisory 
bodies, to establish redress for enforcement, and to ensure that international data transfers 
complied with these high standards); Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
at art. 25 & 26 (setting out adequacy standards, and exemptions, under Articles 25 and 26, 
respectively). 
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its Member States protected its citizens’ fundamental rights to privacy.166 By 
setting the minimum standard, while leaving certain powers to the Member 
States, the European Union has allowed for easier data flow throughout Europe 
and with non-member countries.167 Even if third party countries do not meet the 
European Union’s stringent adequacy standards, like the United States, 
exceptions are made as long as one of a list of certain conditions is met.168 
However, the European Union’s data protection laws are rapidly evolving in 
ways that affect both Member States and non-Member States alike.169 While the 
DPD has been successful in protecting its citizen data privacy, it has only been 
a directive.170 The European Union passed, on the approval of all of its members, 
a uniform regulatory regime to ensure that one system of data protection law 
governs the entire European Union.171 This legislation comes in the form of the 
                                                          
 166 See Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the 
Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431, 433 (1995) (illustrating that most countries in Europe 
had statutes broadly protecting data within the public and private sectors); Council Directive 
95/46 art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42 (EC) (stating the establishment of a standard minimum 
for protection still allows individual countries to enact legislation defining their means for 
monitoring and enforcing data protection). 
 167 See Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An 
Examination of Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the United States, 29 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109, 118-19 (1997) (enacting the Directive has increased and 
expedited data transfers amongst member states because each must adhere to, at least, 
minimum standards. Even if the data transfers from one Member State to another, then to a 
non-Member State, the Directive protects the original country’s data privacy interest 
because the second Member State must adhere to the Directive’s minimum adequacy 
standards). 
 168 See Council Directive 95/46 art. 25-26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 45-46 (EC) (illustrating 
exceptions to adequacy include unambiguous consent; necessity for the performance or 
execution of a contract with the data subject; performance of a contract with a third-party in 
the data subject’s interest; necessity for the public interest or in furtherance of a legal claim; 
protection of vital interests of the data subject; and, lawful transfers made from a public 
register). 
 169 See Warwick Ashford, EU Data Protection Rules Affect Everyone, Say Legal 
Experts, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/4500270456/EU-data-protection-rules-affect-
everyone-say-legal-experts; see Shan Wang, Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation 
is Coming May 25. How Have News Publishers Prepared?, NEIMAN LAB (May 3, 2018), 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/05/europes-general-data-protection-regulation-is-coming-
may-25-how-have-news-publishers-prepared/. 
 170 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 902 (describing that the directive grants 
rights rather than obligating specific actions to facilitate a minimum end result rather than a 
comprehensive set of steps towards such goal. As a directive, the DPD faced limitations of 
only having the authority to set minimum data protection standards for Member States 
rather than as a uniform standard of regulation); see Bowman, supra note 11 (stating that 
while this allowed for easier trade across the European Union, member states implemented 
privacy laws at varying degrees of stringency, making trade sometimes difficult). 
 171 See Bowman, supra note 11; Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 32 (EC). 
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General Rules of Data Protection (GDPR), which replaced the DPD on May 25, 
2018.172 Through the GDPR, E.U. privacy law and global privacy law standards 
will dramatically increase at a rate that the United States’ current regulatory 
scheme cannot keep pace with.173 
B. Evolving Global Data Privacy through the General Data Protection 
Regulation 
On May 25, 2018, the GDPR replaced the DPD as the European Union’s data 
protection framework.174 The GDPR came in response to the changing 
technological environment where electronic data transfers have become more 
prevalent and further reaching.175 The GDPR aims to strengthen the effects of 
the DPD by creating a uniform and enforceable data protection scheme.176 
Though certain similarities between the GDPR and DPD exist, the GDPR 
contains a broader territorial scope, the enumeration of stronger rights of control 
for data subjects, and higher penalties for company violations.177 Additionally, 
while the scope of the DPD only allowed Member States to govern controllers 
and processors within their borders, the GDPR applies to three broad situations: 
(1) when an organization physically operates anywhere within the European 
Union; (2) when the data processed concerns an individual within the European 
Union; and (3) where the national law of an individual Member State is applied 
to benefit public international law.178 With greater concerns for privacy 
protection in a continuously evolving technological environment, the European 
                                                          
 172 See Ashford, supra note 169 (explaining that the GDPR will have significant impacts 
on companies operating within, and out of, the European Union if operations involve the 
personal data of E.U. citizens. Stewart Room, cyber security and data protection partner at 
Pricewaterhouse Cooper stated his belief that the GDPR “will impact every entity that holds 
or uses European personal data both inside and outside of Europe.”). 
 173 Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294-300 (discussing how the FTC has only 
scratched the surface of its power to regulate U.S. data privacy and how it is presently 
unable to keep pace with the rising global standards; however, authors take a different 
approach in rectifying this current situation); cf. De Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 
173, at  315-23 (advocating for an international data privacy organization to reconcile 
differences amongst countries in their data privacy and protection policies). 
 174 See The EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 174, at 2. 
 175 See Bowman, supra note 11 (explaining that since the DPD’s passage twenty years 
ago, technological innovations and the way that society has interacted through technology 
has changed tremendously. Social media, phone apps, and increased spread and function of 
the Internet have all contributed to greater degrees of data transfer). 
 176 See id. 
 177 See id. 
 178 See Gonzago Gallego et al., FUTURE-PROOFING PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PREPARING FOR 
THE EU DATA PROTECTION REGULATION, (2016); Robert Madge, GDPR’s Global Scope: The 
Long Story, MEDIUM (May 12, 2018), https://medium.com/mydata/does-the-gdpr-apply-in-
the-us-c670702faf7f. 
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Union is setting the global standard for individual privacy protection.179 
The GDPR defines its territorial scope in Article Three to include all relevant 
controllers or processors of E.U. citizens’ personal data, regardless of whether 
they physically operate within the European Union.180 Chapter V, Articles 44 
through 49,181 of the GDPR, govern the cross-border transfers of E.U. citizens’ 
data, and are primarily predicated on a certification of the adequacy standard.182 
Under Article 45 of the GDPR, adequacy decisions reaffirmed the ability to 
conduct data transfers when a third party can ensure that its country’s data 
security standards are sufficient to comply with those in the European Union.183 
Adequacy determinations of a country allows for the simplest process for data 
transfers because it requires no additional safeguards to be implemented by a 
business and no additional authorization requirements.184 However, the 
adequacy decision remains subject to periodic review by the European 
Commission.185 In certain circumstances, Article 46 of the GDPR allows for 
cross border data transfers, absent an adequacy decision, with the presence of 
                                                          
 179 See Gallego et al., supra note 178 (explaining how Article 3 of the GDPR creates a 
global standard for privacy protection law because it encompasses “any company that 
markets good or services to EU residents . . . regardless of whether the company is located 
or uses equipment in the EU or not”); O’Connor, supra note 115. 
 180 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 5 (EU) (illustrating that any 
processing of consumer data related to the offering of goods or services to data subjects, 
regardless of payment occurs, and to the monitoring of data subject behavior within the 
European Union). 
 181 Id. at art. 45-49 (emphasizing that Article 45 specifies terms for transfers predicated 
on adequacy decisions. Article 46 states the conditions necessary for cross-border transfers, 
absent an adequacy decision. Article 47 details conditions for transfers using binding 
corporate rules as an adequacy mechanism. Article 48 addresses situations where foreign 
governments and judiciaries order cross-border transfers unpermitted under the GDPR. 
Article 49 lists the conditions for derogations, exceptions, to the GDPR’s prohibition on 
cross-border data transfers, absent an adequacy decision or the use of approved safeguards). 
 182 See Dr. Detlev Gabel & Time Hickman, Chapter 13: Cross-Border Data Transfers- 
Unlocking the EU General Data Protection Regulation, WHITE & CASE (Sep. 13, 2017), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-13-cross-border-data-transfers-
unlocking-eu-general-data-protection; Anna Myers, Top 10 Operational Impacts of the 
GDPR: Part 4 – Cross-Border Data Transfers, IAPP (Jan. 19, 2016), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-4-cross-border-data-
transfers/. 
 183 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 45, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 61 (EU). 
 184 Ariel Teshuva, Why Has the EU Made So Few Adequacy Determinations?, LAWFARE 
(Jan. 2, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-has-eu-made-so-few-adequacy-
determinations. 
 185 See Myers, supra note 182 (discussing that the European Commission determines 
adequacy based on the consideration of numerous factors, including but not limited to, “the 
specific processing activities, access to justice, international human rights norms, the 
general and sectoral law of the country, legislation concerning public security, defense and 
national security, public order, and criminal law.”). 
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appropriate safeguards.186 Article 49 of the GDPR lists appropriate situations for 
safeguards and derogations.187 
Data subjects receive greater rights to data privacy under the GDPR.188 Under 
the DPD, use of safeguards and derogations required unambiguous consent by 
data subjects through either a statement of affirmation or clear affirmative 
action.189 The GDPR raises the standard for applying these derogations to 
require explicit consent, either orally or in writing.190 The explicit consent 
requirement must involve the signing of a separate request for consent by the 
data subject, which grants their permission to have their personal information 
stored and transmitted.191 This standard puts more power in the hands of 
consumers to dictate what personal information is transmitted across borders.192 
The GDPR also grants data subjects several additional rights, including but not 
limited to: the right to restriction processing;193 the right to portability;194 and 
the right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten.195 
Unlike in the United States, the GDPR takes a strong stance to ensure that 
companies, both internal and external to the European Union, comply with its 
                                                          
 186 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 46, 2016 (EU). 
 187 Id. at art. 49 (listing appropriate situations allowing for the use of safeguards in the 
absence of an adequacy decision including explicit consent upon knowledge of the risks, 
necessity for contract performance either between the data subject and the controller or in 
the data subject’s interest, strong public interest, and defense of legal claims). 
 188 See Myers, supra note 182. 
 189 Council Directive 95/46, art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 190 See Myers, supra note 182. 
 191 See id. (acknowledging the GDPR does not explicitly state whether consent is 
necessary only initially or throughout the data management and transfer process. It is 
recommended that companies provide adequate information in their consent requests 
regarding potential data transfers, in addition to actively renewing consumer consent.); see 
also Andrew Clearwater & Brian Philbrook, Practical tips for consent under the GDPR, 
IAPP (Jan. 23, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/practical-tips-for-consent-under-the-gdpr/. 
 192 See The EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 174 (describing the 
subject of explicit consent is controversial because it states that consumers must have rights 
to withdraw consent as they see fit. In the context of e-commerce and contract performance, 
explicit consent is likely to raise issues because consent is a non-negotiable condition on 
obtaining a service with arguable freedom of choice). 
 193 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 18 & 21, 2016 (EU) (stating data subjects can 
restrict controller data processing of their personal data when the subjects contest the data’s 
accuracy, the process of the data is unlawful, the personal data is no longer necessary for 
processing purposes, or if the data subject objects to the process of the data pursuant to 
Article 21(1)). 
 194 Id. at art. 20 (explaining that data subjects, when the processing of data is machine 
automated and based on either consent or contract, have the right to order a controller to 
deliver the personal data concerning him or her in a “structured, commonly used and 
machine-readable format.”). 
 195 Id. at art. 17(1)-(2) (demonstrating that data subjects have the right to require a 
controller to erase personal data controlling him or her, without undue delay, when one of 
several broad circumstances apply). 
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high standards for citizen data protection.196 Data subjects covered by the GDPR 
receive remedial rights, and mainly, the right to compensation for controller, or 
processor violations that result in either material, or non-material, damages.197 
For example, infringement of GDPR provisions, with regard to cross-border data 
transfers, subjects the violating entity to “administrative fines up to 20,000,000 
EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual 
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.”198 While on its 
face 4% seems minimally intrusive, for multibillion dollar companies, this can 
add up to hundreds of millions of dollars in violations and noncompliance.199 
These remedial rights make the GDPR’s reach act as a quasi-global law, because 
even the slight risk of violation for a medium or large sized company outweighs 
the possible financial repercussions if an administrative fine is found to be 
applicable.200 Now with the GDPR’s implementation and the remaining 
compliance uncertainty, companies must change their practices now or face 
enormous penalties later.201 
The GDPR’s implementation has further increased the data privacy gap that 
existed between the United States and the European Union.202 While the DPD 
built the European Union’s foundation of privacy law, the GDPR attempts to 
create a uniform standard amongst its Member States that transcends the E.U.’s 
borders.203 The potential implications and ramifications that noncompliance 
with GDPR standards may have on international dealings has raised red flags 
                                                          
 196 See Bowman, supra note 11; Svantesson, supra note 30. 
 197 GDPR Training, HIPPA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/gdpr-training/ (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2018). 
 198 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 83(5), 2016 (EU) (explaining the GDPR 
includes additional circumstances for administrative fines for violations of its provisions). 
 199 See Bowman, supra note 11; Bernard Marr, GDPR: The Biggest Data Breaches and 
The Shocking Fines (That Would Have Been), FORBES (Jun. 11, 2018, 12:28 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/06/11/gdpr-the-biggest-data-breaches-and-
the-shocking-fines-that-would-have-been/#719f62826c10. 
 200 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 83(2), 2016 (EU) (describing that a variety of 
factors determine whether an infringement warrants an administrative fine and its severity. 
Examples of determinative factors include the nature, gravity, and duration of the 
infringement; the intentional or negligent character of the infringement; actions taken to 
mitigate the damage; and the degree of controller or processor responsibility, to name a 
few). 
 201 See Ashford, supra note 169 (illustrating that the GDPR’s scope goes beyond 
effecting data processors but also those who provide services to them. All companies will 
need to assess whether the GDPR affects them, either directly or indirectly, and, if so, how 
to proactively prepare to comply). 
 202 See Bowman, supra note 11. 
 203 See Ashford, supra note 169; see generally Gilbert, supra note 27 (discussing how 
the GDPR will affect companies worldwide involved in international commerce because its 
protection transcends E.U. Member State borders by following the data trail of E.U. 
citizens). 
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among companies and government officials in the United States.204 Though it 
may be costly upfront, the impetus for change will only increase costs and 
liability if action is not soon taken by the United States.205 To reconcile its 
privacy laws with more stringent global standards, the United States can no 
longer rely on the negotiation of trade agreements, like the Privacy Shield, to 
come to an arguable middle ground.206 The United States must take significant 
preemptive steps toward raising its own standards.207 
C. The GDPR’s Impact on U.S. Based Companies 
Already, the impact of the GDPR has been felt by businesses operating 
outside of the United States.208 On the first day of its implementation, Facebook, 
Inc. and Google, Inc., both U.S. based companies, were sued for alleged 
coercion of consumer consent to sharing their personal data.209 According to the 
complaints, the companies did not allow users free choice to consent to the use 
of their personal data because they were forced into accepting each respective 
                                                          
 204 But see Paul Merrion, Survey Reveals Widespread Ignorance of Europe’s New 
Privacy Regulation, 2016 WL 5955365 (Oct. 14, 2016) (presenting survey findings 
regarding the lack of preparation and knowledge about the GDPR and its potential effects on 
international data transfers. According to the surveys within this study, conducted by Dell 
Software, “[a]bout 82 percent [of the 821 executives surveyed] said they are concerned 
about GDPR but knew little or nothing about its details, and 97 percent said their companies 
do not have a plan to come into compliance.”). 
 205 See Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data 
Flows: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the 
Subcomm. on Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 
21 (2015) (detailing figures about the transatlantic data economy between the European 
Union and the United States); see also Paul Merrion, EU’s New Privacy Reg. Will Require 
75,000 Data Protection Officers Worldwide, 2016 WL 6645854 (Nov. 10, 2016) (discussing 
the findings of a study conducted by the International Association of Privacy Professionals, 
which predicts that companies worldwide will need to hire at least 75,000 data protection 
officers to ensure that organizations stay in compliance with the GDPR’s standards). 
 206 Weiss & Archick, supra note 16. 
 207 See infra Part III (discussing how privacy law in the United States is lagging behind 
with the rest of the world, which may impact future trade if the United States does not 
develop its data protection standards). 
 208 Chris Albers Denhart, New European Union Data Law GDPR Impacts Are Felt By 
Largest Companies: Google, Facebook, FORBES (May 25, 2018, 10:27 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisdenhart/2018/05/25/new-european-union-data-law-gdpr-
impacts-are-felt-by-largest-companies-google-facebook/#46eb34ea4d36. 
 209 See Russell Brandon, Facebook and Google hit with $8.8 billion in lawsuits on day 
one of GDPR, THE VERGE (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/25/17393766/facebook-google-gdpr-lawsuit-max-
schrems-europe (alleging that the new policies written by the companies in anticipation of 
the GDPR were insufficient to allow users a freedom of consent beyond an all-or-nothing 
choice). 
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company’s terms.210 Though both organizations had prepared for the GDPR’s 
implementation, these suits indicate the lack of compliance and regulatory 
backing in the United States that leaves companies susceptible to GDPR 
violations. Facebook has received additional data security scrutiny for its failure 
to comply with the GDPR following two data breach incidents.211 On September 
25, 2018, Facebook experienced a data breach incident, which impacted 50 
million accounts.212 Though less than five million of the users effected were 
European citizens, the incident may still result in a fine up to $1.63 billion.213 In 
a prior similar data breach incident, Facebook received only a £500,000 fine 
under the DPD.214 While this occurrence affected 17 million European citizen 
accounts, this fine was the maximum amount allowed under the now outdated 
Data Protection Act.215 Had the amount been calculated under the GDPR’s 
provisions, this fine would have been roughly $22 million, or 4% of Facebook’s 
global turnover at the time.216 Though the GDPR’s impact on United States 
companies has been minimal thus far, it has already reared its devastating 
potential. 
III. SOMETIMES, SLOW AND STEADY DOES NOT WIN THE RACE 
The United States must alter its mindset towards data privacy if it wishes to 
sustain its international data transfer market.217 While the slowly developing 
                                                          
 210 Denhart, supra note 208. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See Charlie Osborne, Facebook could face $1.63bn fine under GDPR for latest data 
breach, ZDNET (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-could-face-billions-
in-fines-under-gdpr-over-latest-data-breach/. 
 213 See id. (stating that the GDPR’s fine calculations of the greater of either €20 million 
or 4% of annual global turnover, applied to Facebook’s recent financial results, may tops out 
at $1.63 billion). 
 214 See James Vincent, UK data watchdog fines Facebook maximum legal amount for 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, THE VERGE (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/25/18021900/facebook-cambridge-analytica-scandal-
uk-data-watchdog-ico-fines-maximum-amount. 
 215 See id. (stating that even though the maximum fine was awarded, many believed that 
this was insufficient). 
 216 See id. 
 217 See Bennett, supra note 156, at 192-94 (explaining the constant developments in 
technology, business, and the Internet create a highly complex, changing legal landscape. 
Though a method for solution may not be clear, inaction is not a viable option to reconciling 
cultural differences and protecting either nation’s privacy interests); see also Erika Morphy, 
Staring Down the Intersection of ePrivacy, GDPR and Privacy Shield, CMS WIRE (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/staring-down-the-intersection-of-
eprivacy-gdpr-and-privacy-shield/ (discussing aspects of data-sharing not addressed by 
current regulations). 
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sectoral approach to privacy appeases the expectations of United States citizens 
and businesses, it is unsustainable in the long run.218 The United States’ 
approach is too slow to satisfy rapidly growing expectations at an international 
level.219 At its core, the European Union’s emphasis on privacy is a fundamental 
right and willingness to enforce its protection creates a much higher standard for 
privacy protection.220 More countries are embracing this approach toward 
protecting consumer data and privacy by following the European Union’s strict 
approach.221 This rise of global standards complicates international data 
transfers because the United States must either adopt a similar stricter approach 
to privacy or rely on negotiated trade agreements similar to the Safe Harbor 
Agreement and Privacy Shield.222 As evidenced by the Safe Harbor Agreement, 
the United States cannot reasonably rely on the negotiation of dozens of 
agreements to allow companies to safely participate in international data 
transfers because the international data policies will not withstand legal 
challenges.223 Instead, the United States must embrace an omnibus approach, at 
the least, to govern all international data transferred into the United States and 
used by American companies.224 Without a minimum standard in place, 
                                                          
 218 See Brookman, supra note 11, at 371-74 (explaining the government is unlikely to 
place any significant importance on protecting privacy until pressured by American citizens. 
The difficulty in this is that while citizens can sense privacy concerns, they do not 
understand the full extent to which personal data collection, storage, processing, and 
transmitting occurs). 
 219 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 2007-08 (2013) (describing new developments and 
stricter requirements will enlarge the privacy law gap between the European Union and the 
United States. Unless the United States government and companies operating between the 
European Union and the United States respond with increased privacy emphasizes, future 
legal challenges are certain to loom). 
 220 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, art. 7 & 8, 2012 
O.J. C 326/02; Fromholz, supra note 154; Streitfeld, supra note 156 (discussing the current 
approach to privacy law in the European Union). 
 221 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978-79 (describing how the effects of more 
countries following the European Union’s approach towards privacy makes the United 
States’ privacy law lag further behind the regulations necessary to conduct in international 
data trades); see also Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data Protection Rules 
Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2018, 4:50 AM), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-privacy-standards-gdpr-general-
protection-data-regulation/ (describing how countries such as Japan, Israel, and South Africa 
recently conformed to data protection guidelines put forth by the European Union). 
 222 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978-79; see also Bennett, supra note 156, at 192-94 
(describing the importance for Unites States companies to reconcile with the European 
Union’s data privacy regulations). 
 223 See generally U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK DOCUMENTS, 
https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019); see generally 
Tourkochoriti, supra note 33, at 162 (discussing the impact that the disparity between data 
privacy standards in the United States and the European Union has on international data 
transfer relations and negotiations). 
 224 O’Connor, supra note 115; see Seita, supra note 35, at 472-73 (discussing the 
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subsequent international agreements regarding international data transfers are 
likely to fail.225 
A. The United States Must Adopt an Omnibus Approach to Privacy 
Companies and industries operating within the United States are reluctant to 
give Congress a reason to enact overarching privacy regulations.226 Although 
there have been numerous attempts to pass federal privacy regulations through 
Congress, none have successfully passed through.227 The United States’ only 
recent significant change in privacy law is the Judicial Redress Act, which 
addresses international concern over data sharing in the context of criminal and 
terrorism investigations.228 This has been the United States’ only major privacy 
                                                          
globalization of trade and how the United States should adopt a comprehensive data privacy 
and protection regime, similar to the direction taken by that the majority of the world). 
 225 See Mehreen Khan & Jim Brunsden, EU to Demand Tough Data-Protection Rules 
with Future Trade Deals, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e489abba-
0dc5-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09 (describing that as the EU’s regulatory guidelines expand 
globally, the United States’ influence in international trade will diminish); see 
Tourkochoriti, surpa note 33, at 161-62(discussing current negotiations between the 
European Union and the United States on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-TIP), which aims to increase foreign trade and investment between the U.S. 
and the E.U.); see also Eric Shimp, Data Privacy in the Transatlantic Trade Agreement? 
US-EU Ponder the Way Forward, ALSTON & BIRD: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. BLOG (Apr. 10, 
2013), http://www.alstonprivacy.com/data-privacy-in-the-transatlantic-trade-agreement-us-
eu-ponder-the-way-forward/ (discussing how data protection and privacy concerns have 
impacted recent trade negotiations and how they are likely to continue to stall progress of 
agreements between the United States and countries with greater data security standards). 
 226 Neema Singh Guilani & Jay Stanley, The Landmark European Law That Could 
Change Facebook and Improve Privacy in America, ACLU (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/landmark-european-law-
could-change-facebook-and-improve; contra Cameron F. Kerry, Why protecting privacy is a 
losing game today–and how to change the game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018),  
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-
how-to-change-the-game (stating that “a number of companies have been increasingly open 
to discussion of a basic federal privacy law,” because they see “value in a common baseline 
that can provide people reassurance about how their data is handled.”). 
 227 See Boggs & Donoghue, supra note 58; Ashley Baker, Congress must act to protect 
privacy before courts make surveillance even easier, THE HILL (Aug. 7, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/345559-congress-must-act-to-protect-data-
privacy-before-courts-make. 
 228 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(1)(A)-(B), (D) (2014); Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114-126, Feb. 24, 2016, 130 Stat 282 (2016); see also Eric Geller, Everything You Need to 
Know about the Big New Data-Privacy Big in Congress, THE DAILY DOT (Feb. 4, 2016, 
5:28 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-the-judicial-redress-act-europe-data-
privacy-bill/ (describing the significance of the Judicial Redress Act and its impact on the 
European Union and the United States’ international data relations). 
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law advancement since the Safe Harbor Agreement’s invalidation.229 Though 
important to sustaining international data privacy relations, government uses of 
personal data for criminal cases does not address the European Union’s concerns 
for protecting individual’s data as a standard practice.230 
The United States government must take further precautions to protect the 
personal information of its own citizens; otherwise the European Union and 
other third-party countries will take further precautions when conducting 
international data transfers.231 The invalidation of the Safe Harbor Agreement 
proves that the United States’ privacy laws governing consumer data are not on 
par with the European Union.232 However, the United States’ domestic federal 
privacy law landscape remains unchanged since the invalidation.233 With the rest 
of the world adopting privacy approaches similar to the European Union, the 
United States lags further behind.234 Agreements like the Privacy Shield, which 
will attempt to bridge even larger privacy policy gaps than its predecessor, is set 
up for failure from the outset, unless change occurs within the United States.235 
Without the development of consumer data protections in the United States, 
corporations will likely experience exponential increases in costs for 
                                                          
 229 European Commission Press Release, Statement by Commissioner Věra Jourová on 
the signature of the Judicial Redress Act by President Obama (Feb. 24, 2016). 
 230 See Weiss & Archick, supra note 16, at 13. 
 231 See Tourkochoriti, supra note 33, at 161 (indicating that while the United States is a 
valuable trade partner because of its economy’s strength, countries are not willing to 
compromise on their fundamental rights to privacy. Instead, more hurdles to trade 
negotiations arise, prolonging the negotiation process); Nigel Cory, Cross-Border Data 
Flows: Where Are the Barriers, and What Do They Cost?, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION 
FOUND. (May 2017), http://www2.itif.org/2017-cross-border-data-
flows.pdf?_ga=2.231190111.1146412004.1535386038-1536309635.1535386038. 
 232 See European Court of Justice Invalidates U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement, supra 
note 26, at 1-2 (discussing the impact and reasoning behind the invalidation of the Safe 
Harbor Agreement). 
 233 Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (2016); Amy C. 
Pimentel, Safe Harbor update: House votes to pass Judicial Redress Act, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 
22, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=89cf6033-8252-4e78-85d6-
a93acc97a65e (describing the Judicial Redress Act as a means of redressing the invalidation 
of the Safe Harbor Agreement). 
 234 See Gallego et al., supra note 178, at 57 (describing the territorial scope of the GDPR 
and its bolstering effect on international data privacy standards); Business Without Borders: 
The Importance of Cross-Border Data Transfers of Global Prosperity, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE (2014) (explaining that nearly 100 countries are enacting laws that will protect 
both citizens and non-citizens, when data is being transferred through limitations on where 
certain data may be transferred, unlike the United States). 
 235 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978-79 (detailing the effect that rising global 
privacy standards will have on future international data transfer negotiations); Natasha 
Lomas, EU-US Privacy Shield Now Officially Adopted but Criticisms Linger, TECHCRUNCH 
(2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/12/eu-us-privacy-shield-now-officially-adopted-
but-criticisms-linger/. 
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negotiations; insurance; and time delays, among other things.236 In response, 
Apple and Facebook have both advocated for the United States to adopt privacy 
laws in a similar manner to the European Union.237 
While some scholars have correctly noted that the FTC operates as a de facto 
common law and promotes this structure of privacy law development,238 this is 
insufficient to sustain increased international data protection and privacy 
standards. Under the FTC, nearly all cases end in settlement agreements, thereby 
setting no legal binding precedent.239 This practice is unsustainable and lacks the 
function of creating legally binding precedent necessary to develop privacy law 
in the United States.240 Though settlements resolve disputes and hold companies 
accountable, the development of privacy law remains stagnant.241 Additionally, 
the rise of legal threats adversely impacts the government’s motivation to 
increase international data transfers due to high transactional costs and threats.242 
Instead, third-party countries are shaping privacy law in a way that significantly 
impacts U.S. businesses.243 
The advocates for a common law approach to develop privacy law in the 
United States neglect to take into account the significance of data as a global 
commodity.244 For example, while the courts in the United States have been 
reluctant to grant standing for privacy claims absent actual pecuniary harm, 
                                                          
 236 See Tourkochoriti, supra note 33, at 161-64 (2014); see also Shimp, supra note 225. 
 237 See Mehreen Khan, Apple and Facebook call for EU-style privacy laws in US, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/0ca8466c-d768-11e8-ab8e-
6be0dcf18713. 
 238 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 600, 602, 605-07 (analyzing how the FTC 
has emerged as the most influential privacy and data protection authority in the United 
States with an increasingly expanding jurisprudence. The FTC has led to the development of 
industry standards and best practices that companies are liable to comply with). 
 239 See id. at 620-21 (explaining that though the FTC has led to greater enforcement of 
privacy policies, the majority of its cases end as settlements). 
 240 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 842-44 (discussing some of the drawbacks to the FTC’s 
structure of privacy enforcement and suggestions on how it must develop to remain 
effective); United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975) (reasoning 
how the Court did not need to determine whether 15 U.S.C. §§21(l) and 45(l) “permit the 
imposition of daily penalties.”). 
 241 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 842-43 (explaining that confidential terms through 
private settlements limit available guidance on how to develop U.S. privacy law). 
 242 See Coase, supra note 125 (detailing the adverse impact on overall wealth due to 
unnecessary wealth allocation deterrents that minimize the efficiency of economic decision-
making). 
 243 See Ashford, supra note 169. 
 244 Contra Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294 (promoting the bottoms-up 
approach to developing privacy law in the United States, which consists of a slow, common 
law approach); The New Data Protection Laws, ISLE OF MAN INFO. COMMISSIONER (June 
2017), https://www.inforights.im/media/1389/new-data-protection-laws-summary-june-
2017.pdf. 
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international courts are willing to use long arm statutes to pursue international 
privacy claims.245 Though these rulings do not directly impact privacy law in the 
United States, the FTC’s common law approach to privacy cannot remain in its 
current state due to the increasing international expectations.246 Instead, 
Congress should lower the hurdles that the FTC must overcome in promulgating 
nationwide and industry wide rules governing data privacy and protection.247 
B. The FTC: The United States’ DPD 
As the de facto governing body for consumer data in the United States, the 
FTC has entrenched itself as the nation’s regulatory body for consumer data.248 
The FTC was originally given authority based on the necessity to regulate 
technology at a time of exponential technological innovation.249 However, as 
technology has evolved, the FTC’s scope of power has also evolved.250 The FTC 
sets a floor for data protection by aligning corporate practices with industry 
norms and expectations.251 This approach allows the FTC to expand its 
authority, but it is still limited in the ways in which it may pursue a company for 
its practices.252 The impetus for change revolves around Congress’ willingness 
to amend the Magnuson-Moss rules to allow the FTC greater jurisdiction, 
increased control over consumer data protection, and additional rulemaking 
authority within this capacity.253 While Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the 
FTC’s broad jurisdiction, its jurisdiction and practical ability to make rules 
remains severely restrained in the data privacy context.254 
                                                          
 245 See Fram et. al., supra note 135 (discussing the elements looked at by U.S. courts to 
determine whether data privacy and breach claims have standing); see, e.g., Drinkwater, 
supra note 142 (speculating on the significance of Google v. Vidal-Hall and how it may 
allow for more, successful international actions for data privacy and breach). 
 246 Contra Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294, 2297-99; Jules Polonetsky & 
Christopher Wolf, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, The US-EU Safe Harbor: An Analysis of the 
Framework’s Effectiveness in Protecting Personal Privacy 1-2 (2013). 
 247 Contra Gathani, supra note 66, at 33 (positing that the FTC’s rulemaking authority 
should reduce rather than expand); James C. Cooper et. al., Theory and Practice of 
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, ANTITRUST L.J., 1091, 1101, 1104, 1110-11 (2005). 
 248 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 811. 
 249 See Berin Szoka & Geoffrey Manne, Now in its 100th year, the FTC has become the 
Federal Technology Commission, TECHFREEDOM (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://techfreedom.org/post/62344465210/now-in-its-100th-year-the-ftc-has-become-the/. 
 250 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2246. 
 251 See id. at 2266. 
 252 See id. at 2265-75; but see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53. 
 253 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2263, 2266 (arguing that the FTC has only 
scratched the surface of its powers’ reach and should continue to stretch its bounds. The 
FTC must keep pace with the constantly evolving issues of data protection and 
technological innovation). 
 254 See id. at 2289; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
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Scholars have compared the FTC’s current development to that of a common 
law system, but this is too slow and incremental to keep pace with the ever-
changing technological environment.255 Perhaps in more stagnant areas of law 
this would suffice, but data privacy law is best assessed in an international 
context rather than as an issue confined within the bounds of the United States.256 
While advocates for the FTC to develop its authority in a manner similar to the 
common law cite compelling rationales, it would be an unnecessary effort.257 
Additionally, the milder penalties and shorter probationary timeframes for 
Section 5 violations suggested by the authors do not entice companies to remain 
diligent in their efforts to continuously amplify their data protection 
procedures.258 Especially for companies who may incidentally fall subject to the 
GDPR’s provisions, preemptive actions by the FTC, rather than just reactions to 
Section 5 violations, would quickly develop U.S. data privacy law standards 
before international conflicts and suits can emerge.259 Accordingly, a slow 
developing common-law approach is an ineffective solution to close the vast 
privacy protection gap between the United States and the rest of the developing 
world; mainly, the European Union.260 
The ability for the European Union to quickly institute broad privacy 
protections across all of its Member States has stemmed from its recognition of 
the fundamental right to privacy.261 Though the United States’ Constitution does 
not explicitly address personal data privacy as a fundamental right in the way 
that the European Union’s Charter of Rights has evolved, Congress has the 
authority to create a regulatory agency.262 But rather than create a new agency, 
Congress should simply amend the FTC Act to authorize explicit authority to 
                                                          
 255 But cf. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294 (agreeing that the FTC must expand 
and develop its jurisprudence and their bottom-up approach needs to be more transparent to 
benefit companies). 
 256 See generally A Global Standard for Data Protection Law, PRIVACY INT’L, 
https://privacyinternational.org/impact/global-standard-data-protection-law (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2018). 
 257 See generally Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2265, 2294 (describing that the 
rapid growth of the data privacy law field far outpaces that of most areas of law that found a 
common law approach effective). 
 258 See generally id. at 2298. 
 259 Contra id. at 2299 (explaining that because the development of global data privacy 
law far outpaces that in the United States, even though persons in the U.S. remain subject to 
its provisions, the area of law must develop at a rate compatible to the rest of the developing 
world). 
 260 See generally id. at 2270. 
 261 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, arts. 7, 8, 2012, 
O.J. C 326/02; see also Fromholz, supra note 154, at 462. 
 262 U.S. CONST. art. I §§ I, VII. 
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the FTC over the field of data privacy.263 Additionally, there should be an 
amendment of the Magnuson-Moss rulemaking standards, within the data 
privacy context. Such an amendment would expedite the FTC’s rulemaking 
process, such as through simple notice-and-comment procedures.264 This would 
allow the FTC to quickly implement a plan to strengthen data protection across 
a vast number of industries, much like how the DPD raised its standards for all 
of the E.U. Member States, based on industry input and concerns.265 Rather than 
continuing to state best practices or issue consent decrees, which do not create 
any substantive law, the FTC would be able to more easily promulgate legally 
enforceable data protection standards that best serve industry practices.266 If the 
FTC adopts a similar hybrid of DPD and GDPR, standards of uniformity can 
begin to develop across multiple industries across the entire United States.267 
Broadly, the FTC could implement a uniform rule that would require every 
company processing consumer data to create, maintain, and implement data 
protection measures throughout all their business operations.268 The FTC should 
provide additional specifications which could then be further defined to raise 
data protection and quality requirements in response to the developing world.269 
By the end of an allotted compliance period, data protection in the United States 
will have risen to a level that reduces the growing gap between U.S. and E.U. 
data privacy and security laws.270 While not ideal, the GDPR’s approach is the 
                                                          
 263 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 44, at 606 (stating that in the FTC, the United 
States has the basic framework in place for a data privacy and protection regulatory regime; 
however, limitations on its effectiveness occurs through a lack of express power to occupy 
the field and to develop rules). 
 264 Contra Gathani, supra note 66 (criticizing the FTC’s use of its best practices power 
as a way to circumvent the procedural guidelines for promulgating binding rules under the 
Magnuson-Moss Act). 
 265 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 32 (EC); Fromholz, supra note 154, at 
469. 
 266 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 604-06 (describing the FTC’s current regulatory 
authority). 
 267 See Fromholz, supra note 154, at 467-70 (illustrating that the DPD creates a blanket 
coverage of privacy law over the E.U. Member States, without heed towards specific 
industries and use). 
 268 Council Directive 95/46 art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (identifying data quality 
requirements for data processors to abide by when processing personal data. Similar 
provisions would provide adequate instruction for data protection standards required by 
companies irrespective of their industries); see also Lawrence J. Spiwak, Insight: Digital 
Privacy Requires a Cohesive Federal Solution, BLOOMBERG L. (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/insight-digital-privacy-n73014476440 (calling for cohesive privacy 
and data legislation). 
 269 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2271 (explaining that because the 
development of technology and third country data standards are unpredictable, rulemaking 
authority would allow the FTC to take an active role in ensuring data protection instead of 
only being able to respond to unfair and deceptive practices). 
 270 See id. at 2271. 
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new global standard given the uniformity it creates, and the United States must 
further develop its privacy laws.271 The United States must quickly progress by 
beginning with increased FTC authority and rulemaking capabilities.272 
The importance of privacy protection in the developing world has become 
more vital in ensuring international trade relations.273 Because personal data 
privacy is a fundamental right in many countries, the United States cannot 
remain ignorant to this fact by simply attempting to contract around it.274 Instead, 
Congress must explicitly grant the FTC authority over data processing entities 
in the United States and the rights to promulgate rules.275 Once the FTC becomes 
a more significant authoritative body in the data protection field, then the United 
States can begin to develop its privacy laws in a fashion similar to the European 
Union.276 Because United States privacy law should develop in an international 
context, Congress should allow the FTC to more easily promulgate rules that 
encapsulate the international aspects of data.277 Even if the burden is not 
                                                          
 271 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 (EU) (General Data Protection Regulation); see, 
e.g., Kerry, supra note 148 (mentioning proposals to Congress to adapt the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights developed in the Obama administration as a starting point for 
comprehensive privacy legislation). 
 272 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2289-99; see also Fred Donovan, FTC 
Wants Expanded Authority in Data Security, Privacy, HEALTHIT SECURITY (July 19, 2018), 
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/ftc-wants-expanded-authority-in-data-security-privacy 
(FTC Chairman Joseph Simons explaining the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s 
digital commerce and consumer protection subcommittee that FTC “wants the ability to 
impose civil penalties in privacy and data security cases, authority over nonprofits and 
common carriers, and authority to issue implementing rules under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)”). 
 273 See Brookman, supra note 11, at 355-56; O’Connor, supra note 115 (describing how 
current U.S. privacy and data laws “put U.S. companies at a disadvantage globally as 
emerging economies adopt simpler, and often more-EU style, comprehensive approaches.”). 
 274 Tan, supra note 22, at 662-63 (comparing the level of emphasis and significance 
countries around the world place on data privacy as a fundamental right and how the United 
States lags behind many countries in this respect). 
 275 Cf. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2289-300 (supporting the expansion of the 
FTC’s authority and jurisdiction, but in a common law manner, as previously discussed in 
this Note); see also Donovan, supra note 272 (FTC Commissioners advocating FTC needs 
“greater authority in the privacy and data security area,” and Congress needs “to give the 
agency the ability to impose financial penalties and develop ‘sensible safeguards that can 
evolve with the marketplace.”). 
 276 Cf. id. at 2289-99 (discussing areas of regulatory improvement for the FTC and 
agreeing the impetus for privacy law development within the United States is more power 
and action by the FTC); see also Oversight Of The Federal Trade Commission Before the 
Subcomm. on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection on Energy and Commerce, 
115th Cong. 9 (2018) (statement of Rep. Bob Latta) (discussing how “it’s time to look at 
ways to reduce barriers to FTC consumer protection” in relation to data privacy by helping 
it move forward with rulemaking). 
 277 See Robert Bond, Data Privacy is going Global, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=430e4aa4-8120-4444-9fe5-d8d525ecf362 
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lessened, the FTC must still promulgate a rule to shape United States privacy 
law.278 Raising global privacy standards require nations, not just individual 
companies, to have adequate data protections in place.279 Irrespective of if 
Congress eases the burden on the FTC’s rulemaking authority, the FTC must 
create a privacy rule to govern data privacy and protection within the United 
States.280 The existence of this rule will help absolve potential organizational 
liability for inadequate data protection practices, especially when no data 
transfer agreement exists between the United States and the foreign country.281 
The need for a rule is apparent, but first the FTC must address two issues. First, 
whether data standards should follow a DPD approach or a GDPR approach and 
second, how to ease the burden on companies when implementing this FTC 
rule.282 
1. The GDPR Approach: A Shortcut to FTC Success 
The FTC should follow the GDPR’s approach in creating a uniform standard 
for data privacy and protection to be adhered to by all the states.283 Currently, 
states are acting on their own to create minimum data privacy standards and 
rights.284 Like common law, interpretation of privacy law and applicable 
                                                          
(explaining that data protection laws in South Africa, the Middle East, Canada, and much of 
Asia are heavily influenced as a result of the British Commonwealth and former British 
rule). 
 278 Contra Gathani, supra note 66, at 31 (calling for a restraint in rulemaking so that the 
free market can develop practices on its own); see Donovan, supra note 272 (FTC 
Commissioner Rohit Chopra urging Congress that the FTC needs rulemaking authority so 
that it can confront the risk to the economy, society, and national security of inadequate data 
security and privacy.”). 
 279 See THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 280-81 (discussing how international data transfer 
agreements, such as the Safe Harbor Agreement, are more successful when each country’s 
individual standards adequately comply with the others). 
 280 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 604-06 (calling for an increase in the FTC’s 
power and presence within the field of data privacy and protection). 
 281 See McCormac, supra note 27 (outlining proactive steps that companies should, but 
do not always, take in conducting international data transfers without the protection of a 
trade agreement); see also Olorunnipa et al., supra note 31 (detailing how the current 
executive administration has enveloped an inward protection approach to foreign policies, 
which may result in an absence of international data transfer agreements to protect 
companies). 
 282 See Gilbert, supra note 27 (discussing the impact that the GDPR will have on 
businesses globally and what steps companies should take to prepare for its impact). 
 283 But cf. Jolly, supra note 40 (discussing how individual states within the United States 
have set their own data privacy and protection standards); see Spiwak, supra note 268 
(calling for cohesive privacy and data legislation). 
 284 Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, supra note 109 (providing a list of the ten 
states who have incorporated privacy rights within their constitutions); Aaron Mak, 
Vermont, California Charging Ahead of Congress on Data Privacy Laws, SLATE (May 29, 
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standards leads to inconsistencies across jurisdictions.285 This situation 
resembles that of the European Union prior to its enactment of the DPD.286 The 
DPD became outdated with the development of technology and as Member 
States adapted their policies at varying degrees.287 This complicated trade 
amongst Member States, spurring the movement for a uniform standard.288 
Rather than repeat the European Union’s efforts, the United States should forego 
the intermediary DPD-like-structure and instead adopt the uniformity approach 
set forth by the GDPR.289 
The easiest way for the United States to develop its privacy law and to comply 
more effectively with rising global standards is for the FTC to make a rule setting 
a uniform standard across the country.290 The DPD became obsolete because 
European Union Member States set varying standards above and beyond the 
minimum prescribed by the DPD; therefore, impeding trade amongst the 
Member States.291 At this point, the United States has not set any sort of 
                                                          
2018, 2:40 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/state-level-data-privacy-laws-are-
leapfrogging-congress.html (discussing how Vermont implemented the first data broker law 
in the country). 
 285 Fromholz, supra note 154, at 470 (stating that in the United States, privacy refers to a 
variety of contexts, resulting in a broad understanding of privacy as a general concept rather 
than in the specific context of data privacy); Amy Talbott, Privacy Laws: How the US, EU 
and others protect IoT data (or don’t), ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2016, 4:11 PM), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/privacy-laws-how-the-us-eu-and-others-protect-iot-data-or-
dont/ (describing that privacy laws vary by state). 
 286 See Fromholz, supra note 154, at 468-69 (explaining that prior to the DPD, the 
European Union allowed its Member States to govern their own privacy laws, which 
complicated data transfers and trade amongst one another); see also Bowman, supra note 11 
(detailing the structure of privacy law in the European Union prior to the enactment of the 
DPD and GDPR). 
 287 Bowman, supra note 11 (describing the need for data privacy law reform with 
changing technology). 
 288 Id. 
 289 Nick Ismail, Should the US adopt GDPR? INFORMATION-AGE (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.information-age.com/us-adopt-gdpr-123469401/ (arguing that cybercrime 
demands protection similar to GDPR with strict penalties to engender compliance); but see 
IBM Executives Press U.S. Lawmakers Not to Adopt EU Privacy Law, ITPROTODAY (May 
15, 2018), https://www.itprotoday.com/risk-and-compliance/ibm-executives-press-us-
lawmakers-not-adopt-eu-privacy-law (arguing the U.S. should have privacy law tailored to 
its needs and not adopt GDPR). 
 290 See Bowman, supra note 11 (illustrating the perpetual increase in technology signals 
that global data privacy and protection standards are going to increase for the foreseeable 
future, with the GDPR setting the bar); Emilio Iasiello, Will the U.S. Adopt Similar GDPR 
Privacy Concerns??, CYBERDB, https://www.cyberdb.co/will-u-s-adopt-similar-gdpr-
privacy-concerns/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2018) (arguing for security standards in the U.S. 
supervised by the FTC). 
 291 The data protection directive versus the GDPR: understanding key changes, GDPR 
REPORT (Mar. 6, 2018), https://gdpr.report/news/2018/03/06/data-protection-directive-
versus-gdpr-understanding-key-changes/ (describing data breach notification laws which 
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standard; therefore, states are free to develop this area of law creating 
inconsistencies.292 While critics argue that this organic development of the law 
better serves the purpose of developing the law and gaining industry acceptance, 
it is an unsustainable practice because data transcends the borders of the United 
States.293 By taking the initiative to develop privacy law on its own, the United 
States can avoid international lobbying for a global standard, or governing 
agency for data privacy and protection.294 
Data flows freely throughout the world, and the United States cannot be 
complacent in its non-development as global standards continue to increase.295 
If the GDPR does not create a global standard, scholars have posited that the 
United Nations should establish an international data privacy organization to 
govern global data privacy standards.296 This would even further complicate the 
United States’ efforts to flip the script on its data privacy standards in a zero to 
sixty fashion.297 To avoid this scenario, the FTC does not need to raise U.S. data 
standards to the height of global best practices; instead, standards must simply 
be set to an acceptable level that is compatible for international trade absent 
separate trade agreements.298 By following the path of the GDPR at a national 
level rather than through a global organization, the FTC can promulgate a rule 
outlining a uniform standard for data privacy without having to idly wait decades 
for privacy law to develop on its own or succumb to abide by stringent global 
                                                          
vary by member states, became uniform under GDPR). 
 292 See Jolly, supra note 40 (comparing how states have chosen to approach data privacy 
law and how California has set the standard among the states). 
 293 Compare Gathani, supra note 66, at 27 (calling for a decrease in the FTC’s issuance 
of best practices standards so that industries can develop themselves), and Hartzog & 
Solove, supra note 44, at 2289, 2293-94, 2296-97, 2299-300 (promoting a common law 
style of privacy law development in the United States), with Gilbert, supra note 27 
(explaining the global impact of the GDPR on businesses and international transactions), 
and see Gallego et al., supra note 178 (discussing the implications of the GDPR on business 
practices and the stringent data transfer, use, and maintenance requirements that will be 
imposed). 
 294 De Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 173, at 315, 318-22 (advocating for an 
international agency to govern global data privacy if the GDPR is not universally adopted as 
the standard for countries to comply with). 
 295 Solove & Schwartz, supra note 116, at 897, 900, 902 (contending that the United 
States’ current privacy law regime is unequipped to remain viable in international data 
transfers). 
 296 De Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 173, at 315, 318-22. 
 297 See id. at 316-19 (noting complications that a global organization would face in its 
development, and the burden it would have on countries, such as the United States, that 
would have to significantly amend its privacy law framework to adhere to any standard 
established). 
 298 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1974-75; Graham Greenleaf, International Data 
Privacy Agreements after the GDPR and Schrems, 139 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 1, 
2, 5-6, 8 (2016) (describing how the U.S. can shape trade agreements; however, the E.U. 
may not negotiate away privacy rights). 
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standards.299 An FTC rule to effectively meet global data privacy standards 
would significantly lessen the burden on industries to comply.300 
2. Easing the Burden of Implementation for an FTC Rule 
While certain aspects of an FTC rule should be roughly based on the standards 
set by the GDPR, the FTC must decide how to best implement a rule without 
overburdening companies and industries.301 The GDPR’s standards for data 
privacy and protection are burdensome to implement, especially in the United 
States where the existing standards are far inferior.302 While the GDPR limits 
liability for non-compliance in third-party countries to only those organizations 
that collect or process the personal data of E.U. citizens, the continual 
globalization of information and data threatens to envelop nearly all businesses 
across the globe.303 The FTC does not need to emulate such a burdensome 
standard; instead, the FTC only needs to set its standards at a level adequate to 
comply with, and protect those effected by, the GDPR.304 
Currently, most organizations lack information about the GDPR’s expansive 
and stringent provisions.305 On one hand, many companies that operated under 
the Safe Harbor Agreement have already prepared for international data trade 
absent a negotiated agreement between the United States and the European 
                                                          
 299 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 586, 589-90 (arguing that the FTC has developed 
a common law that can serve as a basis for a data privacy regulatory regime). 
 300 Id. at 669, 672-73, 675-76 (arguing that the FTC is well poised to make meaningful 
data privacy regulation). 
 301 Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy 
and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1185-86, 1226 (arguing that FTC 
guidance is needed for the rapidly progressing Internet of Things industries). 
 302 Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements: The 
Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 92 (2017); Griffin Drake, 
Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding EU Data Privacy Compliance Amidst a Sea of 
Uncertainty, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 164, 178, 184-85 (2017). 
 303 See Gallego et al., supra note 178 (discussing how the GDPR only applies to United 
States organizations when they process the personal data of E.U. citizens, yet the constant 
spread of information projects that every business will cross paths with this sort of data at 
some point); see also Gilbert, supra note 27 (stating “[t]hus, any website or mobile 
application that promotes goods or services and is available for access by EU/EEA based 
individuals is within the scope of the GDPR”). 
 304 See Gallego et al., supra note 178; see Foley Hoag LLP, FTC Seeks to Hold 
Companies to GDPR Promises, JDSUPRA (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-seeks-to-hold-companies-to-gdpr-60206/ 
(discussing the FTC’s role in making sure that U.S. companies live up to GDPR standards). 
 305 Merrion, supra note 204 (noting how the majority of businesses throughout the world 
lack preparation for the GDPR and uninformed of its implications and potential impacts on 
international business dealings). 
2018] The Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law 121 
Union.306 However, with uncertainty surrounding the viability of the Privacy 
Shield, companies are left to prepare for trade in compliance with the GDPR’s 
heightened standards absent negotiated international trade agreements.307 
Alternatively, companies that have not worried about international trade 
compliance and who were not affected by the Safe Harbor Agreement and the 
DPD may soon find themselves within the GDPR’s scope.308 Even though an 
FTC rule prior to the GDPR’s implementation is not feasible, the FTC should 
set a timeframe for compliance soon after to prevent companies from being 
subject to harsh non-compliance liability.309 While the burden of implementing 
new policies required under an FTC rule may seem staggering to companies, it 
is slight in comparison to the GDPR’s penalties and potential economic 
benefits.310 To ease the burden of implementing more stringent standards, an 
FTC rule should require the creation of data privacy organizations and 
compliance units at an industry-wide level rather than on a per business basis.311 
Proponents for allowing individual businesses to create their own data privacy 
compliance programs fail to take into account cost feasibility for smaller 
organizations, and the effects of varying industry practices.312 Only larger firms 
                                                          
 306 McCormac, supra note 27 (explaining how the “Safe Harbor” framework provided 
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 309 See Merrion, supra note 204 (explaining that outside of Europe only 22 percent of 
firms said they were prepared for the GDPR and that there is a lack of awareness when it 
comes to the impacts of noncompliance); see also Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 83(6), 
2016 O.J. (L 119) 83 (EU) (stating that fines for non-compliance and violations of the 
GDPR can range from the greater of 20,000,000 EUR, or 4% of annual worldwide turnover 
for violations of basic GDPR principles, to the greater of 10,000,000 EUR or 2% of turnover 
for other lesser violations). 
 310 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 84, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 83 (EU) Regulation 
(EU). 
 311 See Gilbert, supra note 27 (explaining that implementation of the GDPR will require 
“close collaboration between the industry on one end, and governments and their agencies 
on the other.”). 
 312 Dana Simberkoff, GDPR Affects Small Businesses Too, CMSWIRE (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.cmswire.com/information-management/gdpr-affects-small-businesses-too/ 
(explaining that while GDPR compliance is difficult for all organizations, small businesses 
face greater challenges as they “simply may not have the money to put a detailed, high-tech 
security program into place”); see, e.g., How the GDPR impacts and suffocates small and 
medium businesses, I-SCOOP (2016), https://www.i-scoop.eu/gdpr/gdpr-small-medium-
businesses/ (explaining the unintended negative impacts of the GDPR specifically on small 
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have the capital necessary to quickly establish the requisite data protection 
departments and to hire the necessary personnel.313 Expected costs attributed to 
increased data protection requirements, especially for companies without 
preexisting standards, are quite high, making it nearly impossible for smaller 
businesses to comply in their own in a timely manner.314 Additionally, 
compliance by only a portion of the industry complicates domestic dealings 
within the industry due to the inability to ensure equal levels of data privacy and 
protection between companies.315 A lack of standard policies would either 
inadvertently lead to GDPR violations or create numerous data screening 
obstacles to ensure adequate protection throughout its life cycle.316 Instead, the 
FTC’s rule creating data protection agencies would spread the costs so that more 
businesses could guarantee compliance, establish industry data standards, and 
be relieved of the burden of tracking developments in international privacy 
law.317 
Not all companies were subjected to the GDPR upon its implementation.318 
                                                          
businesses and how those businesses can prepare for GDPR regulations). 
 313 See Ray Schultz, The Price of Compliance: Study Uncovers GDPR Costs, 
MEDIAPOST (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/309342/the-
price-of-compliance-study-uncovers-gdpr-costs.html (explaining how new hires that will 
help with GDPR compliance will cost firms hundreds of thousands of dollars). 
 314 See Simberkoff , supra note 312 (“GDPR compliance is certainly no small 
undertaking, and it will require a major shift for many companies, particularly for smaller 
organizations that may not have privacy programs in place.”); see also Coase, supra note 
125 (discussing the impact of heavy burdens and transactional costs on effective, and 
efficient, financial decision-making). 
 315 See Daniel Mikkelsen et al., Tackling GDPR compliance before time runs out, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-
insights/tackling-gdpr-compliance before-time-runs-out (explaining how “many aspects of 
GDPR will be gradually resolved through industry practices and codes of conduct.”); see 
also Allen Pogorzelski, GDPR Coping Strategies: Keeping Calm and Working Toward 
Compliance, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2018/08/23/gdpr-coping-
strategies-keeping-calm-and-working-toward-compliance/#31d07f3e1a02 (stating that 15% 
of companies are completely ignorant to GDPR standards, whereas 15% are strategically 
choosing not to comply). 
 316 See Sara Degli-Esposti & Maureen Meadows, GDPR: 10 easy steps all organisations 
should follow, SILICON REPUBLIC (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/gdpr-coventry-university (explaining how the 
GDPR “is about improving industry standards” and ensuring organizations are “not alone” 
in their compliance efforts). 
 317 Gilbert, supra note 27 (“In the next two years, we hope to have the opportunity to 
receive and analyze guidelines and comments from the various bodies responsible for the 
interpretation and enforcement of the GDPR to assist with the transition to the new data 
protection regime of the EU/EEA. In the meantime, it will continue to be a challenge to 
comprehend and interpret the new rules created by the GDPR.”). 
 318 See id. 
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However, businesses must approach GDPR compliance as if it will affect them 
within the next few years.319 The FTC should ease the burden of implementation 
by using its promulgated rule to address GDPR compliance at the industry level 
rather than by attempting to distinguish between which individual business will 
be affected and when.320 This approach would ease compliance with the GDPR 
because appropriate safeguards of data involved in transfers between countries 
can rely upon the approval of codes of conduct.321 Industry standards for data 
protection and GDPR compliance industry agencies will better protect all United 
States businesses from GDPR violations.322 The FTC already publishes industry 
best practices; therefore, a rule creating industry agencies to monitor data 
protection and compliance standards is not far beyond the FTC’s current 
operations and is vital to the development of the United States’ privacy law.323 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Technological developments continue to ease and increase the collection, 
maintenance, storage, and transmission of data.324 Within seconds, companies 
can collect and transmit data all across the globe.325 However, with large data 
comes immense liability as more countries and their citizens become concerned 
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(explaining how the GDPR affects all industries and compliance efforts need to account for 
this fact). 
 321 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 49, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 64 (EU); see also Myers, 
supra note 182 (explaining that though not contained in the DPD, the GDPR allows the use 
of codes of conduct to demonstrate GDPR compliance while still allowing for a self-
regulated structure. To qualify, codes of conduct “may be prepared by associations or other 
bodies representing controllers or processors, and may be drawn up to address many aspects 
of the GDPR including international data transfers.”). 
 322 See Myers, supra note 182 (“Adherence to these codes of conduct by controllers or 
processors not otherwise subject to the regulation, but involved in the transfer of personal 
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 323 See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (outlining what the FTC does to protect and educate 
consumers). 
 324 See Shangquan, supra note 2 (discussing economic globalization through the rise of 
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INFO SEC. (June 21, 2018), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/gdpr-
encourage-technology/. 
 325 See Pologeorgis, supra note 2 (discussing the rise of international trade in correlation 
with the continuous development of the use of technology in everyday business); see Cory, 
supra note 231 (explaining that the “increased digitalization of organizations . . . has 
increased the importance of data as an input to commerce” in the modern global economy). 
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with personal data privacy and protection.326 Leading the pack is the European 
Union, which strengthened its stance on data privacy and protection through its 
enactment of the GDPR.327 The GDPR is the new global standard that affects 
any and all nations that involve the controlling or processing of personal data for 
E.U. citizens.328 Nations must prepare to comply with these strengthened 
standards; otherwise, their business can be held liable.329 
When it comes to data privacy law, the United States is inept because, unlike 
the rest of the world, it fails to approach this rapidly expanding legal field.330 
Rather than stay on top of data privacy law, Congress continues to allow the 
FTC, a regulatory body not designed to develop law, to serve as the United 
States’ primary data privacy and protection authority.331 This structure will 
likely soon fail as the rapid growth of international regulations threatens to 
adversely impact international data transfers and trade.332 Growth in the United 
States’ protectionist policies could further frustrate efforts to negotiate 
compromises that allow for an assortment of international trade industries.333 As 
the predominant data privacy authority in the United States, the FTC must 
promulgate a rule to spur increased United States data protection standards to 
prevent U.S. companies from falling behind within the global economy.334 
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 331 See id. at 359 (explaining that despite the FTC’s vigilance, Congress must act in 
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Absent Congress passing a federal data privacy law, or easing the Magnuson-
Moss rules, the FTC must face the burden of promulgating a rule governing data 
privacy and protection.335 The implementation of uniform data standards across 
the states would ease domestic trade because businesses and industries would all 
need to remain compliant with one national standard.336 Additionally, the 
creation of industry agencies would allow industries to adapt beyond the set 
general standards needed to comply with international trade inherent within the 
industry.337 It is evident that the United States must improve its data privacy laws 
to keep pace with the rest of the world, and through the FTC, it is possible.338 
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